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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Health Care 
Malpractice Claims Act! (the "Act") in an attempt to remedy, or at least 
ameliorate, a perceived crisis caused by the rising number of medical 
malpractice claims.2 Since its passage, the Act has been amended several 
times. 3 Whether the arbitration mandated by the Act has achieved its 
intended purpose is the subject of extensive study and commentary.4 
Criticism of the Act has led to its recent amendment whereby parties to a 
health claims arbitration proceeding mutually may waive the arbitration 
provisions of the Act. S 
Whether or not the Act accomplishes its stated goals, the Act and 
companion rules of procedure adopted to implement the Act6 (the "BY 
Rules") evidently have generated substantial litigation over procedures 
for, and conditions precedent to, judicial review of a health claims arbi-
tration award. 7 The Court of Appeals of Maryland and the Court of 
1. Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, 1976 Md. Laws 495 (codified at MD. ers. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-Ol to 3-2A-09 (1984 & Supp. 1988»; see also 
Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to the 
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74 (1980). 
2. See Bovey v. Executive Director of HCAO, 292 Md. 640, 641, 441 A.2d 333, 334 
(1980); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 280-81, 385 A.2d 57, 61, appeal 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). See generally MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 
STUDY COMMITIEE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF 1976. 
3. 1988 Md. Laws 1909; 1987 Md. Laws 2721; 1986 Md. Laws 2353 & 2365; 1985 Md. 
Laws 1245; 1981 Md. Laws 2274 & 2358; 1980 Md. Laws 1431; 1979 Md. Laws 
711, 1028 & 1574. 
4. See generally MacAlister & Scanlon, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The 
Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 481 (1985); Abraham, Medical Mal-
practice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 489 (1977); Heintz, Arbi-
tration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is it Cost Effective?, 36 MD. L. REv. 533 
(1977); Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Report of Special Committee on Health Claims 
Arbitration, app. A, reprinted in 89 MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N TRANSACTIONS 
133, 143 (1984) [hereinafter "Special Committee Report"]. 
5. 1988 Md. Laws 1909 (codified at MD. ers. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06A 
(Supp. 1988»; see also 1987 Md. Laws 2721 (an earlier provision permitting waiver 
of arbitration in cases arising prior to July 1, 1987). 
6. MD. R. BYI-BY5 [hereinafter the "BY Rules"]. The BY Rules have not been 
amended as frequently as the Act and consequently do not, in several respects, 
track the language of the Act or the balance of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 
See, e.g., Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 
645 n.2, 526 A.2d 46, 48 n.2 (1987); Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 
519,524 nn.6-7, 490 A.2d 720,722 nn.6-7, cert. denied, 304 Md. 163,497 A.2d 1163 
(1985). Administrative regulations have also been promulgated to implement the 
Act at the Health Claims Arbitration Office level. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 1, 
§§ 03.01.01 to 03.01.15 (1980) [hereinafter "COMAR"]. The regulations have not 
been revised to reflect changes in the Act. Compare id. tit. 1, § 03.01.14 with MD. 
ers. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1988) (regulations have 
not been changed to reflect the reduction in time for filing notice of rejection from 
90 days to 30 days). 
7. Judicial review of a health claims arbitration award is popularly referred to as an 
"appeal" from the arbitration proceeding. Despite this popular terminology, the 
Act narrowly limits the scope of circuit court review of an arbitration panel deci-
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Special Appeals of Maryland have struggled with the provisions of the 
Act and the BY Rules concerning judicial review and have offered incon-
sistent interpretations. 
This article first examines the procedures established by the Act and 
the BY Rules. Next, this article describes the development of case law 
construing the various provisions of the Act and the BY Rules. Finally, 
the author makes suggestions for further clarification of the provisions of 
the Act. 
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A. Overview of the Health Claims Arbitration Process 
The Act establishes a procedure for arbitrationS of claims9 against 
health care providers lO for medical injury!! occurring after the effective 
sion. See infra notes 268-326 and accompanying text; see also Su v. Weaver, 313 
Md. 370, 378 n.3, 545 A.2d 692, 696 n.3 (1988). Also, the review permitted by the 
Act does not resemble traditional appellate review of the substantive legal and fac-
tual basis for a trial court decision. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1988). Consequently, the use of the term "appeal" is mislead-
ing and will not be used in this article. See Ott, 309 Md. at 646,526 A.2d at 49. But 
see Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 608 n.l, 500 A.2d 636,637 n.l (1985) (use of word 
"appeal"). 
In fact, judicial review under the Act technically only refers to a circuit court's 
responsibility under section 3-2A-06. See Tranen, 304 Md. at 608 n.l, 500 A.2d at 
637 n.t. Once that has been accomplished, the case proceeds in the circuit court 
like any other tort action. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. The scope of 
this article is slightly broader, and will use the term judicial review to include circuit 
court review of a claimant's compliance with the condition precedent established by 
the Act. See infra notes 204-217 and accompanying text. 
8. Until July 1, 1987, the arbitration provisions of the Act were mandatory. See supra 
note 5 and accompanying text. 
9. Claims must meet the jurisdictional limit set by the Act of more than $2,500 in 
order to be arbitrable. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-02(a)(1), 4-
402(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Claims of $2,500 or less may be litigated in either the 
appropriate district court or circuit court. [d. §§ 4-401(1), 4-402(d). 
10. The Act defines a "health care provider" as a "hospital, a related institution as 
defined in section 19-301 of the Health-General Article, a physician, an osteopath, 
an optometrist, a chiropractor, a registered or licensed nurse, a dentist, a podiatrist, 
and a physical therapist, licensed or authorized to provide one or more health care 
services in Maryland." MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-Ol(e) (1984 & 
Supp. 1988). Cj. Rosenberg v. Institute of the Pa. Hosp., 72 Md. App. 617, 620, 535 
A.2d 961, 962-63 (1988) (Act inapplicable to health care provider not licensed in 
Maryland). 
One of the more common practical problems encountered under the Act is 
joinder of a claim for strict liability in tort against a drug manufacturer with a 
medical malpractice claim. Under the definition of the Act, a drug manufacturer is 
not a health care provider, and thus the Act does not apply to it. MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-Ol(e) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see Smith Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Teuscher, 310 Md. 676, 678, 531 A.2d 300, 301 (1987) (per curiam); Ralkey v. 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md. App. 515, 518-19, 492 A.2d 1358, 1363 
(1985). But see MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 4, at 492 n.66 (noting that lower 
courts allow complaints against non-health care providers to be litigated before the 
arbitration panel). The court of appeals, however, explicitly has not decided 
whether a non-health care provider may be required to participate in arbitration 
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date of the Act, July 1, 1976. 12 The Health Claims Arbitration Office 
("HCAO") was created to administer the provisions of the Act. 13 A 
claimant 14 commences arbitration by filing a claim with the Director of 
the HCAO (the "Director").15 The Director arranges for service of the 
claim on the health care provider. 16 The health care provider then files a 
response within the time provided in the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 17 
The Director is charged with the responsibility of providing arbitra-
tors for arbitration proceedings. Unless the parties to the proceeding 
agree to forego arbitrationl8 or agree in writing to a single arbitrator,19 
arbitration is conducted before a panel consisting of three arbitrators, 
one chosen from each of three lists of attorneys, health care providers 
and members of the public, respectively.20 Within twenty days after the 
health care provider's response is due, the Director submits to each party 
a list of six attorneys chosen at random from a list maintained at the 
HCAO, along with a biographical data sheet for each attorney on the 
list,21 The claimant and the health care provider each may make two 
under the Act in certain circumstances. Smith Laboratories, 310 Md. at 679, 531 
A.2d at 302. At least one proposal has been put forth for resolving this problem. 
See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 137-38. 
11. The Act defines a "medical injury" as an "injury arising or resulting from the ren-
dering or failure to render health care." MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-Ol(f) (1984 & Supp. 1988). The scope of that definition has been the subject of 
several appellate decisions. See, e.g., Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27,459 A.2d 196 
(1983); Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154,460 A.2d 57 (1983); Long v. Rothbaum, 68 
Md. App. 569, 514 A.2d 1223 (1986). 
12. 1976 Md. Laws 495, § 5. Various appellate cases have interpreted the impact of this 
effective date. E.g., Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,447 A.2d 860 (1982); Dennis 
v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325, 428 A.2d 80 (1981). 
13. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03 (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also Wim-
mer v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 112, 540 A.2d 827, 832, cert. denied, 313 Md. 
506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988) (recognizing importance of Director). 
14. In health claims arbitration proceedings, the party normally denominated the 
"plaintiff" is called "claimant," and the party normally denominated the "defend-
ant" is called a "health care provider." See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-2A-04(a) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Generally, to avoid confusion, this article will 
retain the designations of the parties used in the arbitration proceedings, even when 
referring to them in a circuit court action. 
15. Id. § 3-2A-04(a)(I); COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.03. 
16. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.05. 
17. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a)(I) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.06. The Maryland Rules provide that the response must be 
filed within 30 days of receipt of service. MD. R. 2-321(a). 
18. 1988 Md. Laws 1909 (codified at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06A 
(1984 & Supp. 1988». 
19. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(f) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.07D(3). 
20. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.07A(2). 
21. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.07B. Prior to 1986, the Act required that the list of pot en-
tial panel members submitted by the HCAO contain five names. Contrary to the 
requirements of the Act, and no doubt due to the difficulty in finding panelists who 
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strikes from the list within thirty days after receipt.22 The health care 
provider and the public member panelists are chosen by a similar process 
which commences within twenty days after the Director is notified that a 
prehearing conference has been scheduled. 23 
The attorney panel member is the chairperson of the panel and is 
empowered to decide all questions of pre hearing procedure.24 Generally, 
survive the strike process and thus ultimately serve on the arbitration panel, the 
Director adopted the practice of submitting lists containing six names. Effective 
July 1, 1986, this practice was codified into the Act. 1986 Md. Laws 2353 (codified 
at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988». 
22. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(d)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.070(2). Strikes need not be made if all the persons on the 
list are acceptable. Strikes for cause may also be made within 15 days after receipt 
of the list. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(d)(I); cf COMAR tit. 1, 
§ 03.01.070(2) (inconsistent provision permitting strikes for cause to be made 
within 30 days). More than one claimant or health care provider are treated as a 
single party, and all claimants or health care providers must make their strikes 
jointly. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(d)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
see also COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.070(1). 
23. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(c)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Selec-
tion of panel members is one of the areas that has caused delays in health claims 
arbitration proceedings, often at significant expense to the parties. Unless the panel 
chairperson or the parties diligently monitor the selection of the panel members, it is 
not unusual for a hearing date to approach without available panel members. At 
that point, or at the point when a panel member refuses or cannot serve at the last 
minute, the HCAO offers to the parties its "retiree list," consisting of persons, gen-
erally retired, available on short notice to serve as arbitrators. This list is not chosen 
at random and consequently requires the consent of the parties to its use. See id. 
§ 3-2A-04(b). If the parties do not agree to the use of the retiree list, then the hear-
ing usually must be postponed. 
The Act's requirement that the selection of public member and health care 
provider panelists correspond to the scheduling of the pre-hearing conference con-
tributes to this problem. First, the Act neither requires that a pre-hearing confer-
ence be held nor sets time limits for the scheduling of such a conference, although 
the pre-hearing conference is discussed in both the statute and the applicable regula-
tions. [d. § 3-2A-04(c)(2); COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.10; see also MacAlister & Scan-
lan, supra note 4, at 496. In practice, a panel chairperson usually holds two 
conferences: a scheduling conference held shortly after appointment and a confer-
ence held closer to the hearing date. It is this later conference which most closely 
resembles the one contemplated by the regulations. The scheduling of the pre-hear-
ing conference may not provide sufficient time for panel members to be selected 
prior to the hearing date. Consequently, notwithstanding any requirements of the 
Act, the panel chairperson and the HCAO should strive to have panel members 
selected as early as possible. There is no reason not to amend the Act so that all 
three panel members are chosen at the same time as the panel chairperson. 
Health care provider panel members are chosen from lists which include all 
physicians licensed to practice medicine in the State. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 3-2A-03(c)(4) (1984 & Supp. 1988). In addition, the claimant or the health 
care provider in a proceeding may designate a specialty which the case involves, and 
the Director, "if practicable" must include persons in that specialty on the list pro-
vided to the parties. Id. § 3-2A-03(c)(2). In practice, however, the list provided 
contains no more than one member of the designated specialty. 
24. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.08B. This article will use the term "chairperson" in order 
to be gender neutral. 
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the HCAO retains limited power over the proceeding once the panel 
chairperson is selected.25 The Act permits the Director to exercise cer-
tain limited powers prior to the selection of the panel chairperson and in 
the event that the chairperson is not performing his duties in a timely 
manner or is temporarily unable to serve. 26 
The Act establishes time limits for the completion of discovery27 
and completion of the arbitration process.28 In practice, these time limits 
generally are waived by the parties in all but the simplest cases.29 
At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the panel makes its 
determination in writing and delivers it to the Director.3o The decision 
must contain determinations of liability, damages if appropriate, and an 
assessment of costS.31 The judicial review process commences after the 
panel's determination.32 
Parties to an award may seek its modification by the pane1.33 In 
order to seek modification and delay the time period for seeking judicial 
review, request for modification must be filed within twenty days after 
receipt of service of the award. 34 
25. Cf Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 285, 385 A.2d 57, 63-64, appeal dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978) (purpose of HCAO is to assist parties selecting arbitra-
tion panel members). 
26. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-03(b)(2), 3-2A-05(a)(2) (1984 & 
Supp. 1988). 
27. [d. § 3-2A-05(b)(2) (discovery must be completed within 270 days from the date on 
which all defendants have been served). 
28. [d. § 3-2A-05(g). 
29. Id. § 3-2A-05G). The Act is designed to provide a prompt, efficient mechanism for 
considering medical malpractice claims, and the time limits are designed to accom-
plish those goals. Compliance with the Act, however, imposes significant time de-
lays on the ultimate resolution of a medical negligence case. This is due to a number 
of factors. First, regular members of the medical malpractice bar are limited, and 
their trial calendars are booked well into the future. Second, the necessity of using 
many medical experts, with their very busy schedules, makes the completion of dis-
covery time-consuming. But cf id. § 3-2A-05(d) (Supp. 1988) (generally limiting 
the number of experts used at the arbitration hearing to two in each specialty). 
Third, delays in providing panel members often arise from the HCAO. See supra 
note 23. Finally, delays come about due to the schedules of the panel members 
themselves, particularly the attorney and health care provider members. This cir-
cumstance routinely results in waivers of the statutory time limitations. 
30. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-2A-05(g) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.12E(1). 
31. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(e)-(f) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.12E(1); Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 Md. App. 350, 358, 492 
A.2d 946, 950 (1985); see also Su v. Weaver, 313 Md. 370, 380-83, 545 A.2d 692, 
697-98 (1988). 
32. As will be discussed later in this article, some confusion arises over what is the 
"award" of the arbitration panel for appeal purposes. See infra notes 57-70 and 
accompanying text. In order to standardize terminology, this article will use the 
term "determination" to mean the decision of the arbitration panel, and the term 
"award" to mean the determination when it has been forwarded to the parties in 
accordance with section 3-2A-05(f) of the Act. 
33. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(h) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
34. [d. § 3-222; see also COMAR tit. I, § 03.01.13. 
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B. The Judicial Review Process 
The Act provides that the Director shall cause a copy of the deter-
mination to be served on each party to the proceeding.3s This service is 
accomplished when the HCAO sends copies of the determination to the 
parties or their counsel by certified mail, return receipt requested.36 The 
time limitations for seeking judicial review run from the receipt of the 
award. 37 
Once the award has been served by the HCAO, section 3-2A-06 of 
the Act governs judicial review of the arbitration proceeding.38 Simplis-
tically, section 3-2A-06 sets up a two-part procedure for obtaining judi-
cial review of an award. First, the rejecting party must file a notice of 
rejection with the Director and with the arbitration panel within the time 
period provided in the section.39 Second, the rejecting party must file an 
action to nullify the award in the appropriate circuit court.4O 
The BY Rules supplement the Act and impose additional require-
ments with respect to the judicial review process.41 Rule BY2 describes 
the contents of the notice of action to nullify an award.42 Under Rule 
35. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(g) (1984 & SUpp. 1988); see also 
COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.12E(2). 
36. MD. R. 2-121; c/ COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.05 (refers to superseded Maryland Rules 
of Procedure). 
37. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text (discussing determination of when time for 
seeking judicial review begins to run). This time may be delayed by a timely filed 
application for modification. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a) 
(1984 & Supp. 1988). It is important to note that whereas the time for seeking 
judicial review runs from receipt of an award, when an application for modification 
has been filed, the time runs from the decision on the application, not its receipt. Id. 
38. Id. Section 3-2A-06 provides in part: 
(a) Rejection of award - A party may reject an award for any reason. A 
notice of rejection must be filed with the Director and the arbitration panel 
and served on the other parties or their counsel within 30 days after the 
award is served upon the rejecting party, or, if a timely application for 
modification or correction has been filed within 10 days after a disposition 
of the application by the panel, whichever is greater. 
(b) Action to nullify award - (1) At or before the time specified in subsec-
tion (a) of this section for filing and serving a notice of rejection, the party 
rejecting the award shall file an action in court to nullify the award and 
shall file a copy of the action with the Director. Failure to file this action 
timely in court shall constitute a withdrawal of the notice of rejection. 
SUbject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the procedures 
applicable to the action including the form and necessary allegations in the 
initial pleading shall be governed by the Maryland Rules. 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (Supp. 1988). 
39. Id. § 3-2A-06(a); see also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing 
pleadings mailed instead of filed). 
40. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Section 3-
2A-06(h) of the Act provides that the usual venue rules should apply. Id. § 3-2A-
06(h) (Supp. 1988); see also infra notes 75-105 and accompanying text (discussing 
operation of venue provisions). 
41. MD. R. BY1. 
42. Id. BY2. 
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BY2, the notice must "identify the award and state that it is being re-
jected by the party filing the notice."43 Rule BY4 describes the proce-
dure and timing for further proceedings in the action to nullify.44 Within 
thirty days after filing the notice of action, the plaintifFS must file and 
serve an initial pleading.46 The pleadings and all other proceedings in an 
action to nullify are governed by the Maryland Rules of Procedure.47 
If none of the parties to the arbitration proceeding seeks judicial 
review, the award is final and binding, and the Director must file a copy 
of the award with a circuit court and seek confirmation of the award.48 
Confirmation of the award constitutes a final judgment reflecting the de-
cision of the arbitration panel. 49 After a notice of rejection is filed, the 
failure to file an action to nullify constitutes a withdrawal of the notice of 
rejection, and the award becomes final. 50 
C Effect Of The Award 
Upon commencement of the action to nullify, the case proceeds as if 
arbitration had never taken place, with one important exception: under 
the Act, the award is presumed to be correct and is admissible in evi-
43.Id. 
44. Id. BY4. 
45. Rule BY3 designates the party making the claim against the health care provider as 
"plaintiff" and the health care provider as "defendant." MD. R. BY3; see Wimmer 
v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 108 n.6, 540 A.2d 827,830 n.6, cert. denied, 313 Md. 
506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988). 
46. MD. R. BY4(a). Rule BY4 still refers to a declaration, despite the fact that the 
heading/title of an initial pleading in an action has been changed to a complaint. 
MD. R. 2-302; see Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 
Md. 641, 645 n.2, 526 A.2d 46, 48 n.2 (1987); Wimmer, 75 Md. App. at 110, 540 
A.2d at 831; Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 524 & nn. 6-7,490 
A.2d 720, 722 & nn. 6-7, cert. denied, 304 Md. 163,497 A.2d 1163 (1985). As the 
court concluded in Osheroff, entitling an initial pleading "declaration" instead of 
"complaint" is an inconsequential error. Nevertheless, the BY Rules should be 
modified to reflect the provisions of the current rules in order to reduce confusion. 
See MD. R. BY4(b) (reference in later portion of same rule which refers to current 
rule provision). 
The initial pleading should conform to the requirements of the Maryland Rules 
of Procedure, except that the complaint may not contain a statement of the amount 
of damages other than that they exceed the jurisdictional amount. Id.; cf Osheroff, 
62 Md. App. at 525-26, 490 A.2d at 723 (complaint described as "inartfully drawn" 
was sufficient). 
47. MD. R. BY4(b). 
48. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(i) (Supp. 1988). In practice, the 
prevailing party usually requests that the Director perform this function and pro-
vides the Director with a petition for confirmation for filing. There is often a sub-
stantial delay before this is accomplished by the Director. Since there is no 
important rationale behind having the Director discharge this ministerial step, there 
is no reason not to amend the Act to permit the prevailing party to seek confirma-
tion of the award without action by the Director. Cf infra notes 361-367 and ac-
companying text (proposal for abolishing petition for confirmation except in limited 
circumstances). 
49. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(i) (Supp. 1988). 
50. Id. § 3-2A-06(b). 
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dence. 51 The Act does provide, however, for limited review of the award 
by the circuit court. 52 By filing a preliminary motion to modify or va-
cate, a party may seek a judicial determination that the award is im-
proper on the grounds contained in the Maryland Uniform Arbitration 
Act.53 The circuit court must decide this motion outside of the presence 
of the jury prior to trial54 and may modify or vacate the award if it finds 
sufficient grounds under the provisions of the Act. 55 The case then pro-
ceeds with the modified award or, if the award is vacated, as if no award 
had been made. 56 
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT 
A. Overview 
The statutory framework set out above has given rise to a number of 
appellate decisions interpreting the applicable procedures under the Act 
and the BY Rules. This section of the article discusses several areas that 
have been the subject of litigation. This section considers the timing of 
the judicial review process, the provisions of the Act relating to venue, 
and the issue of compliance with the provisions of the Act and the BY 
Rules required in order that judicial review may proceed. This section 
then addresses the decisions of the court of appeals requiring parties to 
51. [d. § 3-2A-06(d); see also infra notes 218-267 and accompanying text (discussing 
effect of award). It is not uncommon for both parties to the arbitration proceeding 
to reject the award-the health care provider, because of a finding of liability; the 
claimant, based on the amount of damages determined by the panel. In this situa-
tion, the plaintiff usually seeks to utilize the presumption of section 3-2A-06(d) on 
the liability finding and attempts to dispute the damages awarded by the panel. See 
Teimourian v. Spence, 59 Md. App. 74, 76,474 A.2d 919, 921, cert. denied, 301 Md. 
43, 481 A.2d 802 (1984). No appellate decision has directly addressed this issue, 
although dicta in one opinion implies that when the panel has rendered an award in 
favor of the claimants and both the claimants and the health care provider have 
rejected the award, the burden of proof is on the health care provider on the liability 
issue and on the claimants with regard to the damages issue. Hahn V. Suburban 
Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 693, 461 A.2d 7, 12 (1983). The Act, however, 
makes no provision for piecemeal rejection of the award. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-06(a), 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988); cf COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL PAlTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MD. STATE BAR Ass'N, INC., MARYLAND 
CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 27:2, at 595 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS]' Consequently, if a claimant and a health care provider 
reject an award, the Act seems to mandate that neither party is entitled to a pre-
sumption based on the award. Under those circumstances, it makes little sense for 
the jury to even be made aware of the underlying arbitration proceeding. Cf 5 L. 
McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 301.1, at 188-89 (1987) (generally, jury not told 
of presumptions). 
52. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
infra notes 268-326 and accompanying text (discussing motions to vacate). 
53. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also id. 
§§ 3-223(b), 3-224(b) (1984); see also infra notes 268-326 and accompanying text 
(discussing motions to vacate). 
54. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (1984). 
55. [d.; see also id. §§ 3-223(b), 3-224(b) (1984). 
56. [d. § 3-2A-06(c). 
442 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
arbitrate under the Act, the effect of the arbitration award on a circuit 
court proceeding, and the standard for vacating the award. Finally, this 
section considers whether the proceeding can be remanded to an arbitra-
tion panel. 
B. Timing of the Judicial Review Process 
The Act provides that the Director shall serve copies of the award 
on the parties to the arbitration proceeding. 57 In the past, the HCAO 
often took several months to accomplish this procedure. 58 Because of 
this delay, the panel frequently mails copies of the determination to 
counsel to advise them of the results of the arbitration proceeding. When 
a determination has been mailed by the panel before the award is served 
by the Director, some confusion arises over when the pleadings for initi-
ating judicial review should be filed. 
The provisions of the Act are clear, however. The time period for 
filing a notice of rejection and the time period for filing a notice of action 
to nullify begin with service of the award (unless a timely application for 
modification or correction is filed with the panel),59 and only the Direc-
tor can serve the award in compliance with the Act.6O This interpreta-
tion of the Act was confirmed by the court of special appeals in Munzer 
v. Ramsey.61 In Munzer, the panel chairperson granted the motion for 
summary judgment made by one of the health care providers in the arbi-
tration proceeding.62 Subsequently, the other health care providers set-
57. [d. § 3-2A-05(g) (Supp. 1988). 
58. This delay has hopefully been remedied by the provisions of chapter 640 of the 1986 
Maryland Laws, which amended the Act to require the Director to serve the award 
within 15 days of receiving the panel determination. 1986 Md. Laws 2353, 2360 
(codified at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(g) (Supp. 1988». 
59. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a), (b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
60. [d. § 3-2A-05(g) (Supp. 1988). 
61. 63 Md. App. 350, 492 A.2d 946 (1985). 
62. [d. at 354, 492 A.2d at 947-48. The Director of the HCAO has always taken the 
position that a panel chairperson, acting alone, had the power to grant summary 
judgment. But see Stifter v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19,25 & n.3, 488 A.2d 192, 195 & 
n.3, cert. denied, 304 Md. 96,497 A.2d 819 (1985). In Stifler, the court of special 
appeals held that the Act did not authorize this practice. [d. at 24-25, 488 A.2d at 
194-95. While the court did not prohibit summary judgment in general, the opinion 
made it clear that summary judgment could only be granted by the entire panel. [d. 
at 25, 488 A.2d at 195. 
In response to the Stifler decision, the Maryland General Assembly amended 
the Act to permit the panel chairperson, acting alone, to grant summary judgment. 
1985 Md. Laws 1245, 1246 (codified at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-05(a) (Supp. 1988»; see McClurkin v. Maldonado, 304 Md. 225, 234-35, 498 
A.2d 626, 631 (1985); Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 Md. App. 350,362-63,492 A.2d 946, 
952 (1985) (effect of 1985 Md. Laws ch. 104); MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 4, 
at 494-95. 
In their interpretation of the effect of chapter 104, MacAlister and Scanlan take 
an overly technical view of the amendment and the Act's provisions. MacAlister & 
Scanlan, supra note 4, at 495-96. They interpret the amendment to permit summary 
judgment by the panel chairperson only if the Director specifically refers that ques-
tion of law to him. [d. The better view, and the overwhelming practice, is to read 
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tIed their portion of the case, and the remainder of the case was 
dismissed.63 The panel, however, did not assess costs and never delivered 
an award to the Director, but instead mailed copies of the award to the 
parties' counsel. 64 The claimants then sought judicial review by filing a 
notice of rejection and a declaration.6s When the non-settling health care 
provider moved to dismiss the case commenced by the declaration, the 
claimants sought remand to arbitration.66 
The court of special appeals agreed that no valid award had been 
made, because the panel had never delivered the determination to the 
HCAO and no costs had been assessed. 67 These failures undermined 
fundamental requirements of the Act, including the necessity for a public 
record of the panel decision. 68 Under these circumstances, the panel's 
case did not constitute an award pursuant to the Act, and the action was 
dismissed without prejudice.69 
As is evident from both the language of the Act and the decision in 
Munzer, delivery of a copy of the panel's determination as a courtesy has 
no procedural significance. Parties seeking judicial review from this in-
formal action do so at their own peril. 70 
the Act as amended to permit the panel chairperson to determine all issues of law, 
when. and if they arise, without further instructions or reference from the Director. 
The court of appeals adopted this view in McClurkin, a case decided after MacAl-
ister & Scanlan completed their work. 304 Md. at 234-35, 498 A.2d at 631. In 
McClurkin, the court of appeals analogized the panel chairperson, acting alone, to a 
judge in a jury trial with the entire panel the jury. Id. at 235, 498 A.2d at 631. 
Although the Act had not been amended by the time of the decision of the 
panel chairperson in Munzer, the court did not need to consider the issue based on 
its holding. 63 Md. App. at 359 & n.4, 362-63, 492 A.2d at 950 & n.4, 952. 
63. 63 Md. App. at 354, 492 A.2d at 948. 
64. Id.; see also MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-2A-05(f), (g) (Supp. 1988). 
65. 63 Md. App. at 354, 492 A.2d at 948. Evidently the claimants failed to file a notice 
of action to nullify in addition to their notice of rejection and declaration, since that 
was one basis for the health care provider's motion to dismiss. Id. In light of the 
court of special appeals decision, which had the effect of returning the case to the 
arbitration panel, this failure became moot. Id. at 361-62, 492 A.2d at 951-52; see 
also infra notes 352-358 and accompanying text (discussing Munzer in context of 
returning a case to arbitration). 
66. 63 Md. App. at 354-55, 492 A.2d at 948. 
67. Id. at 356-57, 492 A.2d at 949. 
68. Id. at 356, 492 A.2d at 949. 
69. Id. at 362, 492 A.2d at 951-52. The effect of the decision was to return the case to 
arbitration, without further action by the court. Id. at 362, 492 A.2d at 952. 
70. See also McIntyre v. North Arundel Hosp., No. 1107639 (Anne Arundel Co. Cir. 
Ct. 1984). In McIntyre, the plaintiff sought judicial review of a panel determination 
that had been mailed as a courtesy by a panel chairperson. Subsequently, the 
HCAO served copies of the award as provided in the Act, and when no notice of 
rejection or notice of action to nullify were filed within the appropriate time period, 
the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the provisions 
of the Act. The circuit court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case. 
The difference between the decision in Munzer and the decision in McIntyre is that 
in Munzer the panel never took the steps required under the Act. In McIntyre, 
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C. Mailing/Filing Pleadings Seeking Judicial Review 
Another common question confronting counsel seeking judicial re-
view of a health claims arbitration award is whether pleadings must be 
filed with the HCAO and the circuit court by the day on which they are 
due or whether mailing them on that day is sufficient. Often, delays dur-
ing the client's decision whether to seek judicial review may cause the 
filing deadline to loom perilously close, and counsel, accustomed to the 
usual mailing rules,?! sometimes rely on these rules. The Act specifically 
states, however, that both the notice of rejection and the action to nullify 
must be filed (not mailed) within the prescribed time period. 72 
The court of special appeals, in an unreported decision, held that 
under the Act, the pleadings had to be placed in the hands of the filing 
officer, and not merely mailed, within the applicable time periods. Like-
wise, the court of appeals has noted: 
The word "file" is derived from the ancient custom of filing or 
fastening writs and other exhibits on a wire or thread in courts 
and offices for safekeeping and ready reference. Thus a paper is 
said to be "filed" when it is delivered to the proper officer and 
received by him to be kept on file. In modem usage, the "fil-
ing" of a paper consists in placing it in the custody of the 
proper official who makes the proper indorsement thereon.13 
In similar circumstances, both the court of appeals and the court of spe-
cial appeals have held that mailing is not the equivalent of filing. 74 
however, the panel did take the appropriate steps, and the claimant missed the time 
for seeking judicial review. 
Seeking judicial review when the award has not been served is not unlike taking 
an appeal from an order of the circuit court that is not final, and the results can be 
just as harsh.Cf. e.g. Clinton Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Norris, 271 Md. 665, 667, 
321 A.2d at 528, 529 (1974) (dismissal of untimely appeal). 
71. MD. R. 1-321. 
72. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a), (b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
73. Levy v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 210 Md. 265, 273, 123 A.2d 348, 352 (1956); see 
also Dickerson v. Robinson, Slip op. No. 1604 (Md. App. 1985) (per curiam); MD. 
R. 1-322; Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 304 Md. 363, 366 n.4, 499 A.2d 476, 477-78 n.4 
(1985) (dicta stating that "the requirement of filing [a notice of rejection] is satisfied 
only by actual receipt of the document to be filed ... "); Wimmer v. Richards, 75 
Md. App. 102, 106, 113 n.12, 540 A.2d 827, 829, 833 n.12, cert. denied, 313 Md. 
506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988). In Wimmer, the circuit court denied appellate review 
when the notice of rejection was mailed timely but did not reach the HCAD within 
the time period specified in the Act. The court of special appeals reversed and re-
manded for a factual finding of whether the notice of rejection was received by the 
HCAD, but specifically did not address the question of whether mailing alone con-
stitutes proper filing. 
74. See Renehan V. Public Servo Comm'n, 231 Md. 59, 63, 188 A.2d 566, 568 (1963); 
American Casualty CO. V. Department of Licensing & Regulation, 52 Md. App. 
157, 162, 447 A.2d 484, 486 (1982). 
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D. Choice of Forum for Judicial Review Proceedings 
One of the first decisions facing a party seeking judicial review of a 
health claims arbitration award is the court in which to file the notice of 
action and/or the complaint. Section 3-2A-06 of the Act simply requires 
that the action to nullify be filed "in court,"7S with venue to be deter-
mined in accordance with the general venue rules contained in section 6-
201 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated.76 
Rule BY 4 further provides that if the defendant health care provider files 
the notice of action to nullify, the plaintiff may file the declaration in any 
court having venue.77 If the notice of action was filed in a different court, 
the plaintiff must file a certified copy of the notice of action with the 
declaration. 78 
As demonstrated in the cases of Teimourian v. Spence 79 and Ott v. 
Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 80 these provisions have 
caused considerable confusion when both the claimant and the health 
care provider reject an award or when a claimant seeks to proceed in 
federal court. 
In Teimourian, an arbitration panel made an award against the 
health care provider.81 In response, the health care provider timely filed 
a notice of rejection with the HCAO and a notice of action to nullify the 
award with the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Shortly there-
after, the claimants also filed a notice of rejection with the HCAO and a 
notice of action to nullify with the Circuit Court for Harford County.82 
Subsequently, the claimants filed a timely declaration against the health 
care provider in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The health care 
provider filed a preliminary motion in the Harford County proceeding 
objecting to venue. This motion was granted, and that case was trans-
ferred to Montgomery County.83 
Well over one year after the notice of action to nullify was filed in 
Prince George's County, the clerk of that court dismissed the case pursu-
ant to the provisions of then applicable rule 530 of the Maryland Rules of 
Procedure.84 Apparently believing that they had obtained a tactical ad-
vantage by the dismissal of the Prince George's County case, the claim-
75. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). The term 
"court" is defined in the Act to mean a circuit court for a county. [d. § 3-2A-Ol(c) 
(1984). 
76. [d. § 3-2A-06(h) (Supp. 1988). 
77. MD. R. BY4(a)(2). 
78. [d. 
79. 59 Md. App. 74, 474 A.2d 919, cert. denied, 301 Md. 43, 481 A.2d 802 (1984). 
80. 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 (1987). 
81. 59 Md. App. at 76, 474 A.2d at 920. 
82. [d. As discussed above, the claimants sought to reject only the damage portion of 
the award. See supra note 51. The court of special appeals never addressed the 
issue of whether this partial rejection was appropriate. 
83. 59 Md. App. at 76, 474 A.2d at 920. 
84. [d. at 77, 474 A.2d at 920. Rule 530 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure has since 
been superseded by substantially similar rule 2-507. 
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ants then dismissed the case pending in Montgomery County and 
persuaded the Director to file a petition for confirmation of the award. 
The circuit court ultimately granted the petition for confirmation, 
prompting the health care provider's appeal. 8S 
The court of special appeals, reversing the action of the circuit 
court, held that when a declaration is filed in a jurisdiction other than 
that in which the notice of action is filed, the filing of the declaration 
constitutes automatic consolidation of the two cases.86 Once venue ques-
tions, if any, are resolved, the court with venue retains jurisdiction and 
the other court is dispossessed of jurisdiction. 87 The court of special ap-
peals concluded that the health care provider had done everything re-
quired to seek judicial review and that rather than gaining a tactical 
advantage by dismissing their action, the claimants had abandoned their 
right to further judicial proceedings.88 
Neither the Act nor the BY Rules contemplate the continuation of 
proceedings commenced by a defendant's notice of action other than by 
prosecution of the declaration filed by a claimant. It makes sense to con-
solidate the various notices of action and to proceed in a single court 
having venue.89 The claimants in Teimourian evidently overlooked one 
important element when deciding their tactical course: Once the health 
care provider properly rejected the award and sought judicial review, 
there was no award to confirm. Section 3-2A-05(i) permits confirmation 
of an award only if judicial review is not sought.90 An award that has 
been properly rejected91 has absolutely no further effect on the parties, 
and their only rights relate to the action to nullify.92 By dismissing their 
action, the claimants abandoned their cause of action against the health 
care provider. 
85. 59 Md. App. at 78, 474 A.2d at 921. 
86. Id. at 86, 474 A.2d at 925. Presumably, the result would be the same in a case 
where the claimant chose not to reject the award but merely to file a declaration in a 
different county than that which the health care provider chose for the notice of 
action to nullify. 
87.Id. 
88. Id. at 85-86, 474 A.2d at 924-25. 
89. In a case with more than one health care provider, it is conceivable that each health 
care provider could file a notice' of action to nullify in a different circuit court. 
Under the holding in Teimourian, a single court having venue would retain jurisdic-
tion to continue the proceedings. If multiple courts have venue over all the health 
care providers, the venue chosen by the claimant when filing the complaint should 
control. If the circuit court chosen by the claimant does not have venue over all the 
health care providers, it should either dismiss the case as to those health care prov-
iders over which it does not have venue or transfer the case to a court which does 
have venue over all of the health care providers. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 6-20 1 (b) (1984); MD. R. 2-327(b). 
90. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(i) (Supp. 1988). 
91. See id. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
92. Id. § 3-2A-06(d) (the award does have an effect in the proceedings commenced by 
the action to nullify due to its presumption); see also infra notes 218-267 and accom-
panying text (discussing effect of award). 
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In Ott,93 the court considered the procedure to be followed when a 
claimant seeks judicial review of a health claims arbitration proceeding 
against one defendant in state court and another defendant in federal 
district court.94 Prior to Ott, in Group Health Association v. Blumen-
thal,9S the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that compliance with the 
Act is a prerequisite to invoking federal diversity jurisdiction.96 The 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland also deter-
mined in Davison v. Sinai Hospital 97 that the arbitration provisions of the 
Act were substantive in nature and thus must be complied with when 
maintaining a malpractice claim in federal court.98 Ott provides some 
guidance with respect to such compliance. 
In Ott, the claimants sought judicial review of an award rendered by 
an arbitration panel in favor of an individual and a corporate health care 
provider, and sought to continue proceedings against the corporate 
health care provider in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.99 In 
order to perfect this judicial review, the claimants filed a notice of rejec-
tion with the HCAO and an action to nullify in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County. The action to nullify named both the individual 
health care provider and his corporate employer as defendants. Subse-
quently, the claimants filed a complaint in the circuit court naming only 
the individual health care provider as a defendant and a complaint in the 
United States district court naming only the corporate health care pro-
vider as a defendant. 
In response to the notice of action, the corporate defendant moved 
for dismissal and for confirmation of the award. 1OO The circuit court dis-
missed the action and confirmed the award, apparently because the 
claimants had not filed the complaint in the same court where the notice 
of action had been filed. 101 
The court of appeals reviewed the purpose behind the procedural 
provisions of the Act, and reversed the decision of the circuit court. 102 
The court concluded that although the claimants had not fully complied 
93. Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 
(1987). 
94. Judicial review of a single health claims arbitration proceeding could not occur in 
more than one state circuit court because of the operation of Rule BY 4 and the 
venue provisions of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code. See MD. Crs. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 6-201 to -204 (1984 & Supp. 1988); MD. R. BY4(a)(2). 
95. 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198 (1983). 
96. [d. at 108 n.5, 453 A.2d at 1202 n.5. 
97. 462 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). 
98. [d. at 780. 
99. 309 Md. at 644, 526 A.2d at 48. 
100. [d. at 645, 526 A.2d at 48. The court of appeals does not describe the procedural 
mechanism by which the defendant sought confirmation of the award. As noted 
above, the Act only contemplates the Director of the HCAO seeking confirmation. 
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
101. 309 Md. at 645, 526 A.2d at 48. The defendant apparently intended to dispose of 
the federal court complaint by the application of the principals of res judicata. 
102. [d. at 645-48, 526 A.2d at 48-50. This discussion has important ramifications with 
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with the provisions of the BY Rules,103 such noncompliance was insub-
stantial and in no way subverted the policy served by the rules. The 
court also determined that the legislature did not intend to limit the fed-
eral court's jurisdiction and thus the definition of "court" in the Act in-
cluded a federal district court. 104 Although not specifically enunciating 
the procedure for seeking judicial review of a health claims arbitration 
award in federal court, the decision in Ott suggests that a party seeking to 
proceed in federal court should file both the notice of action to nullify 
and the complaint in that court. 105 
E. Standard of Review for Compliance with the Act 
The majority of appellate decisions reviewing cases arising under the 
Act have focused on the question of whether strict compliance with the 
Act is necessary to invoke judicial review or whether substantial compli-
ance with its provisions is sufficient. A review of these decisions demon-
strates that the appellate courts have offered inconsistent interpretations 
of the Act. 
1. Strict Compliance-Tranen v. Aziz 
The issue as to whether strict or substantial compliance with the 
provisions of the Act is necessary to invoke judicial review was addressed 
first by the court of special appeals in Tranen v. Aziz. 106 In Tranen, the 
regard to survival of the strict compliance doctrine. See infra notes 176-182 and 
accompanying text. 
103. 309 Md. at 649, 526 A.2d at 50. 
104. Id. at 649-53, 526 A.2d at 50-52; cf. MD. Crs. & IUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
06A(c)(I) (Supp. 1988) (after election to waive arbitration, complaint may be filed 
in circuit court or federal district court). In Davison, the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland concluded that the legislature could not have 
intended to attempt to oust federal court jurisdiction over judicial review of health 
claims arbitration proceedings, and consequently the definition of the term "court" 
contained in the Act must include a federal district court. 462 F. Supp. at 779. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Ott agreed with this common sense analysis. 309 
Md. at 648-49, 526 A.2d at 50; see also id. at 654, 526 A.2d at 53 (McAuliffe, I., 
dissenting) (Maryland General Assembly and court of appeals most likely over-
looked possibility of federal diversity jurisdiction when adopting the Act and BY 
Rules). 
105. This may present a procedural difficulty, because the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure make no provision for commencing an action by a notice of action to nullify. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (action commenced by complaint). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland made clear, however, that filing two separate documents is not necessary 
to accomplish that purpose. Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, 
Inc., 309 Md. 641, 649, 526 A.2d 46, 50 (1987); see also id. at 656, 526 A.2d at 54 
(McAuliffe, I., dissenting). Thus, a claimant could combine the notice of action 
with a complaint. The procedure to be followed by a health care provider remains 
in doubt, although the court of appeals did leave open the possibility that the re-
quirement of a notice of action to nullify, as opposed to the arbitration process itself, 
might be deemed to be procedural in nature by the federal court and thus might not 
be required when proceeding in a federal district court. 309 Md. at 649 n.5, 526 
A.2d at 50 n.5. 
106. 59 Md. App. 528,476 A.2d 1170 (1984), aff'd, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985). 
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arbitration panel rendered an award in favor of the health care provider, 
and the claimants sought judicial review of that decision. The claimants 
had filed a declaration which alleged the same acts of negligence as in 
their HCAO claim,101 but which did not explicitly ask to nullify the arbi-
tration award. Later, beyond the time permitted for filing a notice of 
rejection, the claimants filed a copy of their declaration with the HCAO. 
In response to the declaration, the health care provider filed prelimi-
nary motions objecting to the claimants' failure to fulfill the requirements 
for invoking judicial review of the award under the Act. IOS Subse-
quently, in an attempt to cure the deficiencies in their judicial review 
pleadings, the claimants filed an amended declaration, which contained 
language purporting to seek both a nullification of the award and a notice 
of action. 109 
The circuit court dismissed the case for failure to comply with the 
provisions of the Act, and the claimants appealed to the court of special 
appeals. The court of special appeals affirmed the decision of the trial 
court.110 The court noted that the claimants had failed to file timely a 
notice of rejection and had failed to file timely a notice of action to nullify 
the award. III 
The claimants had argued that despite their failure to comply with 
the literal requirements of the Act, they had "substantially complied" 
with the Act.112 The court, rejecting the claimants' contentions, con-
cluded that, in order to invoke judicial review, compliance with these 
provisions of the Act and the BY Rules is mandatory.ll3 
The court noted that the Act itself provides the sanction for non-
compliance with these provisions: Unless judicial review is properly 
sought, the award is final and binding on the parties. I 14 Thus, the court 
concluded that non-compliance with the judicial review procedures of 
the Act mandated dismissal of the proceeding. I IS 
Previous attempts by claimants to avoid the provisions of the Act by commencing 
an action directly in a circuit court had already been rejected. Wimmer v. Richards, 
75 Md. App. 102, 108-09, 540 A.2d 827, 830-31, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 
A.2d 1344 (1988); Schwartz V. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 324, 452 A.2d 1302, 1305 
(1982); Bishop V. Holy Cross Hosp., 44 Md. App. 688, 692, 410 A.2d 630, 632 
(1980). 
107. 59 Md. App. at 530, 476 A.2d at 1171. 
108. [d. at 530-31, 476 A.2d at 1171. 
109. [d. at 531, 476 A.2d at 1171-72. 
110. [d. at 538, 476 A.2d at 1175. 
111. [d. at 533-34, 476 A.2d at 1173. 
112. [d. at 534-37, 476 A.2d at 1173-75. 
113. [d. at 534-35, 476 A.2d at 1173-74. This interpretation is not surprising in light of 
the use of the words "must" and "shall" in section 3-2A-06 of the Act and rule 
BY4, respectively. 
114. MD. Crs. & JUD. PRoe. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(i) (Supp. 1988). Section 3-2A-05(i) 
makes the award final and binding "subject to § 3-2A-06," implying that all of § 3-
2A-06 must be complied with to invoke judicial review. See Tranen, 59 Md. App. at 
538, 476 A.2d at 1175. 
115. 59 Md. App. at 538, 476 A.2d at 1175. 
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2. Erosion of Strict Compliance - Mitcherling, Osheroff and Brothers 
The strict compliance rule enunciated in Tranen began to erode in 
Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 116 the next decision of the court of special appeals 
to consider judicial review of a health claims arbitration award. This 
erosion continued in Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc. 117 and Brothers v. 
Sinai Hospital. lls All three cases involved non-compliance with mere 
technicalities which did not prejudice the other side and thus these cases 
did not lend themselves readily to the application of the strict compliance 
rule. I 19 
In Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 120 the court considered whether sending a 
copy of a notice of rejection to the individual panel members is a prereq-
uisite to invoking judicial review. 121 In Mitcherling, the arbitration panel 
rendered an award in favor of the health care provider. 122 The claimant 
sought judicial review of the award by timely filing an action to nullify 
the award in the circuit court. 123 In addition, the claimant filed a notice 
of rejection with the Director and sent a copy to counsel for the health 
care provider. 124 The claimant failed, however, to send a copy to the 
individual panel members as required by section 3-2A-06(a) of the Mary-
land Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated. 
The health care provider argued that judicial review of the award 
was inappropriate because the claimant had failed to send copies of the 
notice of rejection to the panel members. 125 Despite the recent opinion in 
Tranen, however, the court rejected the health care provider's strict com-
pliance argument. After reviewing the purpose behind the notice of re-
jection, the court determined that the legislature could not have intended 
to require that a notice of rejection be mailed to the panel members as a 
prerequisite to judicial review. 126 The implementing regulations for the 
116. 61 Md. App. 113,484 A.2d 1060 (1984), ajJ'd, 304 Md. 363,499 A.2d 476 (1985). 
117. 62 Md. App. 519, 490 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 304 Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). 
118. 63 Md. App. 235, 492 A.2d 656 (1985). 
119. See Wimmer v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 109-10,540 A.2d 827, 831, cert. denied, 
313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988). 
120. 61 Md. App. 113,484 A.2d 1060 (1984), ajJ'd, 304 Md. 363,499 A.2d 476 (1985). 
121. Id. at 121,484 A.2d at 1063-64. 
122. Mitcherling V. Rosselli, 304 Md. 363, 364-65,499 A.2d 476, 476-77 (1985). The 
court of special appeals opinion is somewhat unclear in presenting the actual proce-
dural posture of the case, but the decision of the court of appeals clarifies it. In the 
past, the Director of the HCAO, at the request of the party opposing judicial review, 
would file a petition for confirmation of the award pursuant to the Act if there was a 
procedural defect in the attempt to perfect judicial review. Generally, a denial of 
this petition was immediately appealable, as opposed to the denial of a motion to 
dismiss the action to nullify, which was only appealable at the conclusion of the 
case. However, the Director has since ceased this practice. 
123. 61 Md. App. at 115, 484 A.2d at 1060-61. 
124.Id. 
125. Id. at 115,484 A.2d at 1060; see also MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
06(a) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
126. 61 Md. App. at 118,484 A.2d at 1062. When discussing Mitcherling, the court in 
Wimmer V. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 108-10,540 A.2d 827, 831, cert. denied, 313 
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notice of rejection section provided that the party rejecting the award 
could do so by filing the notice of rejection with the Director and serving 
the notice on each other party.127 The court noted that the agency im-
plementing the statute contemplated a filing only with the HCAO, not 
with the individual panel members. When the Act was amended in 1979 
to consolidate filings with the HCAO, however, the legislature "failed to 
delete" the requirement that a notice of rejection be filed with the arbitra-
tion panel. Thus, the court concluded that this filing became "merely a 
courtesy. " 128 
In both Tranen and Mitcherling, the court considered the failure of 
claimants to comply with the statutory requirements of the Act for seek-
ing judicial review of a health claims arbitration award. The analytical 
approaches taken by the court in each case, however, are almost directly 
opposed. In Tranen the claimants completely disregarded the provisions 
of the Act, whereas in Mitcherling the claimant complied with the Act 
except for a seemingly inconsequential provision. Nevertheless, because 
the claimants in both cases complied with some but not all of the require-
ments of section 3-2A-06 of the Act, the award should have been final 
and binding pursuant to section 3-2A-05. 129 
In Osheroff, 130 the third case involving this issue, an arbitration 
panel rendered an award in favor of the claimant, and the health care 
providers timely filed a notice of rejection with the HCAO and with the 
circuit court.131 The claimant then filed pleadings in the circuit court 
entitled "Action to Nullify HCA Award" and "Amended Action to Nul-
lify HCA Award."132 The health care providers sought dismissal of the 
Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988) focused on the Mitcherling court's rejection of 
"technical irregularities" as means of depriving a party of legal rights. 61 Md. App. 
at 121, 484 A.2d at 1064. This is not surprising in light of dicta in the Wimmer 
opinion. See infra notes 183-191 and accompanying text. 
127. 61 Md. App. at 119, 484 A.2d at 1062 (citing COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.14B(1». 
128. 61 Md. App. at 119, 484 A.2d at 1063. 
129. In Tranen, Judge Bishop summed up the results succinctly: 
Section 3-2A-05(h) of the [Act] makes the award final and binding on the 
parties "subject to § 3-2A-06," implying that all the requirements of the 
judicial review section must be cOmplied with to bring suit in court. If 
court suit could be brought despite noncompliance, the arbitral award 
would not be "final and binding" on the parties, as the statute prescribes. 
59 Md. App. 528, 538, 476 A.2d 1170, 1175 (1984). Despite the seemingly trivial 
nature of the requirement at issue in Mitcherling, the same language would seem to 
apply. 
130. 62 Md. App. 519,490 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 304 Md. 163,497 A.2d 1163 (1985). 
131. Part of the procedure followed by the health care providers is recorded by the court 
of special appeals in its opinion. Id. at 522, 490 A.2d at 721. The court of special 
appeals opinion seems to imply that because the health care providers failed to file a 
notice of action to nullify, they failed to perfect their appeal. See MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988); MD. R. BY2. The health 
care providers' brief reveals, however, that they did file a notice of action and there-
fore properly perfected their appeal. See Brief for Chestnut Lodge, Inc. at 3, Osher-
offv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519,490 A.2d 720 (1984) (No. 1016), cert. 
denied, 304 Md. 363, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). 
132. 62 Md. App. at 524, 490 A.2d at 722. 
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claimant's action, arguing that because the claimant failed to file the ap-
propriate pleadings, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
claim.133 The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. 134 
The court of special appeals cited Tranen, but distinguished the case 
before it, holding that dismissal was not warranted. The court distin-
guished between failure to comply with the requirements of the Act and 
failure to comply with the rules of procedure after the provisions of the 
Act had been met. l3S The court found that although the claimant's origi-
nal pleading failed to meet the requirements of the rules and the 
amended pleading only barely met those requirements, dismissal was not 
proper. 136 
The court of special appeals decision in Osheroff used an improper 
analysis. In its attempt to differentiate between the BY Rules and the 
Act, the court ignored the fact that the Act itself requires the Maryland 
Rules of Procedure to establish at least a portion of the procedure for 
seeking judicial review. 137 Since the Act further provides that an award 
becomes final unless the Act's provisions are followed,138 and since the 
Act incorporates by reference the rules of procedure, it is inconsistent to 
say that a party complied with the Act but not the rules related thereto. 
Moreover, the court made no attempt to reconcile the differing anal-
yses in Tranen and Mitcherling. In fact, having reached a result similar 
to the one in Mitcherling, the court neither cited the case nor explicitly 
used the substantial compliance analysis. 139 In an already confused area, 
the Osheroff decision contributed little guidance for practitioners. 
Shortly after the Osheroff case, the court of special appeals further 
eroded the doctrine of strict compliance in Brothers v. Sinai Hospital. 140 
Brothers involved claimants' attempts to seek judicial review of an unfa-
vorable arbitration award. The claimants filed a notice of rejection and a 
notice of action to nullify, both of which were captioned "Before the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland."141 The originals of 
those documents were filed with the HCAO, while copies were filed with 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City along with a declaration. The 
health care providers sought dismissal of the action, claiming that be-
cause the caption of the pleadings indicated that they were filed in the 
HCAO and because only a copy of the notice of action to nullify was filed 
133. [d. at 522, 490 A.2d at 721. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 525-26, 490 A.2d at 723. 
136. [d. at 526, 490 A.2d at 723. The opinion described the amended pleading as having 
been "inartfully drawn" and one which "would never suffice as a model." [d. 
137. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
138. [d. § 3-2A-05(i). 
139. The reason for the court's failure to articulate the substantial compliance analysis 
may result from the fact that the claimant did not substantially comply with either 
the Act or the BY rules. See Osheroff, 62 Md. App. at 525-26, 490 A.2d at 723. 
140. 63 Md. App. 235, 492 A.2d 656 (1985), aff'd sub nom., Cherry v. Brothers, 306 Md. 
84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986). 
141. 63 Md. App. at 237, 492 A.2d at 657. 
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in the circuit court, the pleadings were filed in the wrong forum.142 The 
circuit court agreed, dismissing the action and confirming the award. 143 
The court of special appeals reversed the action of the circuit court, 
applying the erroneous distinction between compliance with the provi-
sions of the Act and compliance with the rules of procedure first enunci-
ated in Oshero./f.l44 Focusing on the claimants' actions taken before 
reaching the circuit court, the court of special appeals found that the 
claimants had fully complied with the terms of the statute. 145 The court 
reasoned that the claimants' miscaption of a pleading, although not con-
stituting strict compliance with the rules, was one that could have been 
corrected easily by amendment and thus was not fatal to the action. 146 
3. Mitcherling, Tranen and Brothers-The Court of Appeals 
Mitcherling v. Rosselli,147 Tranen v. Aziz 148 and Cherry v. Broth-
ers 149 represented an opportunity for the court of appeals to address 
whether strict compliance with the Act was necessary or whether sub-
stantial compliance was sufficient. In reviewing the court of special ap-
peals decisions, the court of appeals had the opportunity to resolve the 
differences between the various approaches taken below. Despite this op-
portunity, the court of appeals failed to reconcile the divergent decisions 
of the court of special appeals. Furthermore, the court of appeals' analy-
sis of the compliance question also remains a source of confusion. 
First, in Mitcherling v. Rosselli, ISO the court of appeals determined 
that although the claimant had failed to file a copy of his notice of rejec-
tion with the arbitration panel and with the Director as required by the 
Act, the claimant's actions constituted "literal compliance" with the Act; 
therefore, the petition for confirmation was properly denied. lSI Conse-
quently, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether strict com-
pliance with the provisions of the Act was necessary, since it determined 
that actual compliance had occurred. ls2 
142. [d.; see MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
MD. R. BY2. 
143. 63 Md. App. at 237-38, 492 A.2d at 657. 
144. Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 525, 490 A.2d 720, 723, cen. 
denied, 304 Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). 
145. 63 Md. App. at 238, 492 A.2d at 658. 
146. [d. at 238-39, 492 A.2d at 658. The court of special appeals left open the possibility 
that prejUdice to the health care providers might change the result. [d. In Wimmer 
v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102,540 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 
1344 (1988), the court characterized the decision in Brothers as "based on the fact 
that appellees were not prejudiced." [d. at 110, 540 A.2d at 831. 
147. 304 Md. 363,499 A.2d 476 (1985), aff'g 61 Md. App. 113,484 A.2d 1060 (1984). 
148. 304 Md. 60S, 500 A.2d 636 (1985), aff'g 59 Md. App. 528, 476 A.2d 1170 (1984). 
149. 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986), aff'g Brothers v. Sinai Hosp., 63 Md. App. 235, 
492 A.2d 656 (1985). 
150. 304 Md. 363,499 A.2d 476 (1985). 
151. [d. at 367, 499 A.2d at 478. 
152. [d. at 368, 499 A.2d at 478. A dissenting opinion by Judge Smith, in which Judge 
Eldridge and Judge Couch joined, questioned the majority's analysis of the legisla-
454 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
Less than one month after Mitcherling, the court of appeals affirmed 
the decision of the court of special appeals in Tranen v. Aziz and squarely 
upheld strict compliance. ls3 Announcing that it would "determine the 
procedures an aggrieved party must follow to obtain judicial review of an 
arbitration award,"ls4 the court examined in detail the requirements of 
section 3-2A-06. ISS The court held that a notice of rejection, a notice of 
action to nullify, and a declaration were required in order to perfect judi-
cial review. ls6 Absent compliance with each of these provisions of the 
Act and the implementing BY Rules, any attempt to secure judicial re-
view must be dismissed. ls7 The court rejected claims of substantial com-
pliance with the judicial review procedures, holding that such procedures 
were mandatory. ISS 
The court of appeals' opinion was not a unanimous one, however, 
and the concurring opinion of Judge McAuliffe foreshadowed the diffi-
culties the court would have applying the doctrine of strict compliance in 
the future. ls9 Judge McAuliffe was troubled by the court's apparent re-
quirement that three separate filings were necessary to achieve strict 
compliance with the Act. 160 Thus, his concurrence leaves open the possi-
bility that, under the concept of substantial compliance, parties could 
perfect judicial review by filing a pleading or pleadings combining the 
attributes of a notice of rejection, a notice of action to nullify, and a 
declaration. 161 
Finally, in Cherry v. Brothers 162 the court of appeals upheld the 
court of special appeals' decision in Brothers v. Sinai Hospital, but with a 
slightly different analysis. 163 The court of appeals once again reviewed 
tive intent, but did not intimate how the doctrine of substantial compliance might 
have changed the result if the majority had determined that the claimant had not 
complied with the provisions of the Act. Id. at 368-70, 499 A.2d at 478-79 (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
153. 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985). 
154. Id. at 608, 500 A.2d at 637. 
155. Id. at 610-14, 500 A.2d at 638-40. 
156. Id. at 612-14, 500 A.2d at 639-40. 
157. Id. at 614, 500 A.2d at 640. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 614-15, 500 A.2d at 640-41 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). Judge McAuliffe's 
concurring opinion was joined by Judge Rodowsky. Five judges had joined in Judge 
Cole's majority opinion. 
160.Id. 
161. Id. at 615, 500 A.2d at 641; see also Wimmer v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 109 
n.8, 540 A.2d 827,831 n.8, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988) (discus-
sion of Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion). Cj. infra notes 359-375 and accom-
panying text (proposal to abolish notice of rejection and notice of action to nullify). 
Having authored the opinion in Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 304 Md. 363,499 A.2d 476 
(1985), it is not surprising that Judge McAuliffe also left open the possibility that 
combining pleadings might be literal compliance with the provisions of the Act. 
What is surprising is that Judge McAuliffe did not utilize the substantial compliance 
doctrine in Mitcherling. 
162. 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986). 
163. Brothers v. Sinai Hasp., 63 Md. App. 235, 492 A.2d 656 (1985), aff'd sub nom., 
Cherry v. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986). 
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its earlier expositions of the requirements for seeking judicial review l64 
and, as in Mitcherling, found that the claimants had fully complied with 
the requirements despite the miscaption of their pleadings and the fact 
that the circuit court had never received an original pleading. 16s 
4. The Bright Line Rule--Spivey and Ott 
Less than one year after the court of appeals decided Brothers, the 
court of special appeals, in Golub v. Spivey, 166 sounded the death knell for 
the doctrine of strict compliance set forth in Tranen. Shortly thereafter, 
the court of appeals in Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, 
Inc. 167 adopted the Spivey rationale, although in a distinct procedural 
posture. Instead of relying on the subterfuge of literal compliance, the 
Spivey and Ott courts adopted a bright line rule which may reconcile 
prior cases. 
In Spivey, the health care provider filed a notice of rejection with the 
HCAO and a notice of action to nullify with the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City, seeking judicial review of an adverse arbitration award. 168 
The claimant failed to file a declaration within the Act's thirty-day time 
limit provision,169 whereupon the health care provider filed preliminary 
motions to dismiss. 170 These motions were ultimately denied, and the 
case proceeded to trial, resulting in an adverse jury verdict for the health 
care provider. 171 
On appeal, the health care provider again attacked the claimant's 
164. 306 Md. at 88-89, 507 A.2d at 615. 
165. Although presented with a perfect opportunity to do so, the court of appeals did not 
adopt the bright line rule first enunciated by the court of special appeals in Osheroff 
v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 525,490 A.2d 720,723, cert. denied, 304 
Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985), and followed in Brothers, 63 Md. App. at 238, 492 
A.2d at 657-58; see infra notes 166-182 and accompanying text (adoption of bright 
line rule by court of appeals and court of special appeals). The court of appeals also 
pointed out that the rules do not require a typewritten original to be filed, Cherry, 
306 Md. at 90-91,507 A.2d at 616, and that the rules then in effect did not provide 
any requirements for a caption, id. at 91, 507 A.2d at 616-17. Cf MD. R. 1-301(a) 
(requirements for caption). Therefore, regardless of whether the pleading was an 
original and properly captioned, it was "filed" as required by the Act. 306 Md. at 
92,507 A.2d at 616-17. In fact, the records of the circuit court reflected that the 
document was filed. Id. 
166. 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394, cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 954 (1987). 
167. 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 (1987). 
168. 70 Md. App. at 151, 520 A.2d at 396. 
169. Id. at 152, 520 A.2d at 396. Counsel for the claimant alleged that the late filing of 
the complaint was due to their non-receipt of the notice of action to nullify and 
notice of rejection. Id. 
170. The procedural history of Spivey is tortuous. The health care provider filed both a 
motion raising preliminary objection and a motion ne recipiatur or to strike with the 
circuit court. Neither of these motions were allegedly received by counsel for the 
claimant, and no response was filed. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed the 
case. However, upon receipt of a copy of the order dismissing the case, the claimant 
filed a motion to set aside the dismissal, and this order was ultimately granted. Id. 
at 152-53, 520 A.2d at 396-97. 
171. Id. at 153, 520 A.2d at 397. 
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failure to file a timely complaint. 172 The court of special appeals differen-
tiated between those requirements set forth under the Act and those set 
forth under the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 173 The court of special 
appeals concluded that because the rules, not the Act, require the filing 
of a complaint within thirty days after a notice of action to nullify, failure 
to satisfy that requirement did not mandate dismissal. 174 This decision 
makes clear that, at least with respect to any action required to be taken 
after the notice of rejection and notice of action to nullify are filed, the 
court of special appeals will not require strict compliance. 175 
The court of appeals indicated its concurrence with this view in Ott 
v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc. 176 In Ott, the claim-
ants filed a notice of rejection followed only by a pleading entitled "Ac-
tion to Nullify Award."177 The court of appeals held that failure to 
comply with Rule BY4(a)(1) does not require dismissaP78 and that it was 
an abuse of discretion to dismiss when the pleading was no more than a 
complaint subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim but with leave 
to amend. 179 Thus, the court of appeals would permit an amendment of 
172.Id. 
173. Id. at 155-58, 520 A.2d at 399-400. 
174. Id. In his argument, the health care provider pointed to language in Tranen which 
appeared to be dispositive of the issue in Spivey: 
If the award is in favor of the claimant and the health care provider rejects 
the award and files a notice of action to nullify, and thereafter the claimant 
fails to file a complaint within the allotted time, the arbitral award is nulli-
fied and the case is concluded. 
Tranen v. Aziz, 59 Md. App. 528, 533-34,476 A.2d 1170, 1173 (1984), aff'd, 304 
Md. 605, 508 A.2d 636 (1985) (quoted in Spivey v. Golub, 70 Md. App. at 158,520 
A.2d at 399-4(0). The court rejected this language, however, as dicta. 70 Md. App. 
at 158, 520 A.2d at 399-400. In Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health 
Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 650 & n.7, 526 A.2d 46, 51 & n.7 (1987), the court of 
appeals rejected the language of the court of special appeals in Tranen as well as 
pointing out that it was "conspicuously omitted" from the court of appeals decision 
in Tranen. See Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985). The trial court 
in Spivey was vested with discretion to determine the appropriate sanction for un-
timely filing. 70 Md. App. at 157-58, 520 A.2d at 399-400. The standard to be 
utilized by the trial court is to examine the consequences of the failure "in light of 
the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 157, 520 A.2d at 399; see MD. R.I-201(a). 
The decision of the trial court will only be reversed upon abuse of discretion. 70 
Md. App. at 158,520 A.2d at 399. 
175. Although the court of appeals denied certiorari in Spivey v. Golub, 310 Md. 2, 526 
A.2d 954 (1987), in the very next decision dealing with the Act, the court cited the 
court of special appeals decision with approval when discussing the requirement 
that a complaint be filed. Ott, 309 Md. at 647 n.3, 652, 526 A.2d at 49 n.3, 52. 
176. 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 (1987). 
177. Id. at 652, 526 A.2d at 52. The reason for the claimants' failure to file a complaint 
was the claimants' attempt to have their case heard both in state court and the 
United States district court. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
178. 309 Md. at 652, 526 A.2d at 52. The court termed it an "insubstantial noncompli-
ance" and explained it to be a noncompliance which does not subvert the policy of 
the rules. In so doing, the court held that violations of Rule BY4(a)(I) are to be 
considered under the provisions of Rule 1-201, which permits wide discretion. Id. 
(citing MD. R. 1-201). 
179. Id. at 652, 526 A.2d at 52. Judge McAuliffe dissented from the majority opinion, 
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the notice of action to nullify to conform to the pleading requirements for 
a complaint. 180 Although Ott may be limited to the peculiar circum-
stances of that case, 18l its language clearly signifies adoption of the Spivey 
rationale by the court of appeals. 182 
5. Beyond the Bright Line-Wimmer 
Dicta in the most recent opinion by the court of special appeals, 
Wimmer v. Richards,183 suggests the inclination of that court to ignore 
the bright line rule established by Spivey and Ott and to extend the doc-
trine of substantial compliance to any requirement of the Act for perfect-
ing judicial review. In Wimmer, claimants sought judicial review of an 
adverse health claims arbitration award by mailing the various required 
pleadings to the appropriate filing officers. 184 The health care providers 
moved to dismiss the circuit court proceeding, arguing that the claimants 
had failed to file a notice of rejection, and the circuit court dismissed the 
case. 18S The court of special appeals reversed and remanded on a narrow 
principally on the ground that the majority went further than to permit the claim-
ants to escape a vexing procedural problem which they did their best to avoid on 
their own. Id. at 653-57, 526 A.2d at 52-55. Judge McAuliffe objected to the ma-
jority's decision to allow the claimants to proceed against the corporate health care 
provider in state court, despite the claimants' express intention not to do so. Id. at 
656-57, 526 A.2d at 54. Judge McAuliffe would have dismissed the case without 
prejudice, so that the claimants could proceed in federal court as they desired. Id. 
at 657, 526 A.2d at 54-55. 
180. Id. at 652, 526 A.2d at 52. In his dissent, Judge McAuliffe seemed troubled by the 
majority's holding that an amendment is permissible to allow the filing of a com-
plaint when the pleading being amended neither resembled a complaint nor was 
intended to be one. Id. at 657, 526 A.2d at 54-55. 
181. The decision in Ott was clearly an attempt by the court of appeals to extricate dili-
gent claimants from a procedural problem acknowledged to result from an oversight 
in the Act and the BY Rules. See id. at 654, 526 A.2d at 53. Thus, the decision 
may not present a fair reading of the view of the court of appeals when presented 
with less diligent claimants where no such problem exists. However, in Wimmer v. 
Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 540 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 
1344 (1988), the court of special appeals interpreted Ott as "resolv[ing] the uncer-
tainty over substantial versus strict compliance." Id. at 111, 540 A.2d at 832. But 
see infra notes 183-191 and accompanying text (criticizing the court's opinion in 
Wimmer). 
182. As already noted, the court of appeals cited Spivey with approval in Ott. 309 Md. at 
647 n.3, 652, 526 A.2d at 49 n.3, 52. The court of appeals cited its opinion in 
Cherry v. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986), as if it was the genesis for the 
distinction between the requirements of the Act and the requirements of the BY 
Rules, which it definitely was not. See supra note 165. 
183. 75 Md. App. 102, 540 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988). 
184. Id. at 105-06, 540 A.2d at 829. 
185. Id. at 106,540 A.2d at 829. Whether or not the HCAO actually received the notice 
of rejection is a subject of dispute. All the other addressees of the mailing had 
received timely notice of the pleadings. The health care providers, in support of 
their motions, established that the notice of rejection did not appear on the HCAO 
docket. Id. The court of special appeals, however, held that a legitimate inference 
could be drawn that the notice of rejection had been timely filed, based on the certif-
icate of service and receipt by other addressees. Id. at 106 n.4, 540 A.2d at 829 n.4. 
See L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 301.2, at 196-97, § 301.3, at 219 n.61. 
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holding. 186 
Despite the narrow holding in the case, the court of special appeals 
used the opinion as a vehicle for broad dicta virtually disposing of strict 
compliance. Although the court acknowledged the previous application 
of the strict compliance doctrine, the court also discussed its erosion in 
subsequent cases. 187 The court ignored the distinction established by ear-
lier decisions188 between violations of the BY Rules and violations of the 
provisions of the Act, and seemed to extend substantial compliance anal-
ysis to any action taken to seek judicial review under the Act. 189 Thus, 
the Wimmer opinion extends the faulty analysis begun in earlier deci-
sions190 and misinterprets the court of appeals decision in Ott to further 
the reach of the doctrine of substantial compliance. 191 Since the dicta in 
Wimmer presents such a broad extension of the doctrine and since the 
narrow holding in that case precluded full analysis of such an extension, 
reliance on the Wimmer opinion should be severely limited. 
6. Standard of Review-Summary 
The Maryland appellate courts have had difficulty formulating an 
approach to reviewing compliance with the judicial review procedures of 
the Act. Having ostensibly rejected the doctrine of substantial compli-
ance in Tranen v. Aziz, 192 the court of appeals thereafter offered the alter-
native of "literal compliance" when faced with various procedural 
defects.193 Despite sound rejection of the doctrine of substantial compli-
ance in Tranen, the appellate courts continue to use the doctrine even if 
186. 75 Md. App. at 113, 540 A.2d at 833. The court remanded the case to the circuit 
court for a factual finding to determine whether or not the HCAO had received the 
notice of rejection, and if so, whether it was subsequently misplaced. [d. The court 
withheld ruling on whether the doctrine of substantial compliance would save the 
claims in the latter situation. [d. 
187. [d. at 108-11, 540 A.2d at 830-32. 
188. See supra notes 166-182 and accompanying text. 
189. 75 Md. App. at 111, 540 A.2d at 832. 
190. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text. 
191. Although the court of appeals in Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health 
Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 (1987), adopted the bright line rule, the Wim-
mer court ignores the decision of Golub v. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147,520 A.2d 394, 
cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 954 (1987). For example, the court in Wimmer 
construed the language in Ott that discusses "substantial compliance with the 
Rules" to permit application of the doctrine of substantial compliance to the filing 
of a notice of rejection. Wimmer, 75 Md. App. at 111, 540 A.2d at 832 (interpreting 
Ott, 309 Md. at 651, 526 A.2d at 51). The Wimmer case was decided under an 
abuse of discretion standard. [d. at 113, 540 A.2d at 833. This standard is applied 
to consideration of "rule-prescribed" requirements. Golub, 70 Md. App. at 157,520 
A.2d at 399. 
192. 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985); see supra notes 153-161 and accompanying text. 
193. Cherry V. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 613 (1986); Mitcherling V. Rosselli, 304 
Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985); see supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. 
Literal compliance differs from strict compliance in that there is some defect in the 
attempt to perfect judicial review which the court interprets as being within the 
literal meaning of the Act. 
1988] Judicial Review of Health Claims Awards 459 
only for violations of the BY Rules,194 and broad dicta in a recent case 
would extend it even further. 195 Each approach has its difficulties: Strict 
compliance may lead to particularly harsh results; 196 literal compliance is 
hard to apply and often calls for strained construction of the Act; and 
substantial compliance conflicts with the mandate of the legislature. 197 
Taken together, the various appellate opinions seem to require a 
party seeking judicial review to comply with the requirement that a no-
tice of rejection be filed, albeit with the place of filing loosely con-
strued. 198 Similarly, the courts seem to require that a notice of action to 
nullify be filed, although again with some leeway.199 Nevertheless, the 
boundaries of the doctrine of literal compliance are not well defined. 
Since the Act specifically deals with a failure to file these pleadings 
timely,2°O parties seeking judicial review should pay close attention to 
them and ensure that they are timely filed notwithstanding recent dicta 
which seems to loosen the statutory restrictions. Beyond the mere filing 
of those pleadings, the trend is to permit much more latitude. In fact, the 
latest cases adopt a very liberal attitude toward compliance with the pro-
visions of the BY Rules,201 despite the fact that those rules are mandated 
194. Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113, 484 A.2d 1060 (1984), aff'd, 304 Md. 
363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985); Tranen, 304 Md. 605, 614-15, 500 A.2d 636, 640-41 
(McAuliffe, J., concurring). This assumes that substantial compliance differs from 
literal compliance. 
195. Wimmer v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102,540 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 
545 A.2d 1344 (1988). 
196. It is not surprising that the doctrine of strict complaince was developed from 
Tranen V. Aziz - the case with the most egregious failure to comply with the Act's 
provisions. See Ott V. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 
641,651,526 A.2d 46,51 (1987); Tranen V. Aziz, 59 Md. App. 528, 530-31,476 
A.2d 1170, 1171-72 (1984), aff'd, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985). 
197. Cf MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06A(c)(3) (Supp. 1988) (failure to 
file timely complaint after election to waive arbitration may constitute grounds for 
dismissal upon finding of prejudice). 
198. Compare Tranen V. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1984) (no notice of rejection 
filed) with Mitcherling V. Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113, 484 A.2d 1060 (1984), aff'd, 
304 Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985) (notice of rejection filed with HCAO but not 
with panel members). But see Wimmer V. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102, 540 A.2d 
827, cert. denied, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1344 (1988) (dicta extending doctrine of 
substantial compliance). 
199. Compare Tranen V. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985) (notice of action to 
nullify filed over 60 days after service of award) with Cherry V. Brothers, 306 Md. 
72, 507 A.2d 613 (1986) (notice of action to nullify was filed, but arguably filed in 
HCAO instead of circuit court). 
200. Section 3-2A-05(i) of the Act makes the award final and binding on the parties 
unless section 3-2A-06 is complied with. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-05(i) (Supp. 1988). A final award may be confirmed and become a final judg-
ment among the parties to the arbitration proceeding. [d. The court in Wimmer 
did not intimate how application of the doctrine of substantial compliance to plead-
ings required under section 3-2A-06 would affect the operation of these statutory 
sections. 
201. Ott V. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 
(1987); Golub V. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394, cerro denied, 310 Md. 2, 
526 A.2d 954 (1987); cf Wimmer, 75 Md. App. at 112-13, 540 A.2d at 832-33 (dicta 
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by the same section of the Act which requires a notice of rejection.202 
How far the appellate courts will permit a party to deviate from the BY 
Rules remains to be seen.203 
F. Failure to Arbitrate 
In addition to compliance with the provisions of section 3-2A-06 of 
the Act, the court of appeals also has interpreted the Act to include a 
requirement that a claimant actually arbitrate, not just file, a claim with 
the HCAO in order to be entitled to circuit court review.204 In Bailey v. 
Woei,20S the claimants filed a claim with the HCAO and conducted dis-
covery.206 At the scheduled hearing, however, the claimants refused to 
produce any evidence in support of their claim, whereupon the panel dis-
missed the case.201 The claimants sought judicial review of the dismissal, 
and the circuit court dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the 
claimants had failed to fulfill a condition precedent to commencement of 
an action in circuit court.208 
On appeal, the court of appeals considered whether the claimants' 
actions satisfied the "condition precedent" established by the Act.209 Re-
jecting the claimants' argument that the mere filing of a claim satisfied 
the condition,210 the court held that the Act required "a thorough dis-
pute resolution process in which a plaintiff would produce evidence to 
prove his case before the arbitration panel prior to filing suit in court."211 
extending doctrine of substantial compliance). A good case can be made for limit-
ing Golub to its facts, since the claimant alleged that she did not even recieve notice 
of the health care provider's notice of action to nullify and notice of rejection. 70 
Md. App. at 151-52,520 A.2d at 396-97. Similarly, Ott also may not represent the 
position of the court of appeals when the latter is confronted with the issue of a 
claimant filing an untimely complaint. See supra note 181; cf Wimmer, 75 Md. 
App. at 109, 540 A.2d at 831. 
202. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also supra 
notes 137-138 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between requirements 
of Act and requirements of BY Rules). 
203. The Maryland Rules of Procedure provide considerable discretion to courts dealing 
with rule violations. MD. R. 1-201(a). On the other hand, the appellate courts 
consistently have held that the rules are not guides, but "precise rubrics." See, e.g., 
Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 346, 278 A.2d 71, 73 (1971); 
Williams v. State, 22 Md. App. 714, 717, 325 A.2d 427, 429 (1974). Unfortunately, 
the balancing of these competing policies does not lend itself to predictability. 
204. Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984). 
205. [d. 
206. [d. at 40, 485 A.2d at 265-66. The court of appeals described the discovery as "min-
imal." [d. 
207. [d. 
208. The court of special appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court in a brief 
opinion. Bailey v. Woel, 55 Md. App. 488, 462 A.2d 91 (1983), aff'd, 302 Md. 38, 
485 A.2d 265 (1984). 
209. 302 Md. at 41 n.2, 485 A.2d at 266 n.2 (citing MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-2A-02(a) (1984 & Supp. 1988) and Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 
283-84, 385 A.2d 57, 63, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978». 
210. 302 Md. at 42, 485 A.2d at 266-67. 
211. [d. at 42,485 A.2d at 267. The court of appeals considered and rejected authority 
1988] Judicial Review of Health Oaims Awards 461 
The scope of the Bailey decision was considered in Wyndham v. 
Haines. 212 In Wyndham, an arbitration panel dismissed the claimants' 
case after a hearing on the merits for failure to present a prima facie 
case.213 After the claimant filed pleadings seeking judicial review, the 
circuit court dismissed the case for failure to arbitrate based on the 
claimants' failure to present a prima facie case before the panel. 214 The 
court of appeals, reversing the lower court's dismissal, refused to extend 
its holding in Bailey to require that a claimant establish a prima facie 
case before the arbitration panel. The court held that an "evidentiary 
shortcoming" cannot be equated with a failure to arbitrate.2ls 
In light of Wyndham, the scope of Bailey seems to be severely lim-
ited.216 Only if a claimant willfully refuses to present evidence at the 
arbitration hearing will the case be dismissed at the circuit court level for 
failure to arbitrate. Less egregious inaction does not constitute failure to 
satisfy the Act's precondition.217 
to the contrary, stating that it did not give sufficient deference to the statutory 
scheme. 302 Md. at 44, 485 A.2d at 267-68 (discussing Phoenix Gen. Hosp. v. 
Superior Ct., 138 Ariz. 504, 675 P.2d 1323 (1984»; see also Fisher v. Herrera, 367 
So.2d 204 (Fla. 1978). 
212. 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986). 
213. Id. at 271,503 A.2d at 721. The reason for the claimants' failure is not reflected in 
the record. Id. at 272 n.3, 503 A.2d at 721 n.3. However, the court of appeals 
commented that the failure was not based on a deliberate refusal to present evidence 
like that in Bailey. Id. at 271 n.l, 503 A.2d at 721 n.l. 
214. Id. at 272-73, 503 A.2d at 721-22. 
215. Id. at 275, 503 A.2d at 722-23. The court of appeals stressed the fact that the circuit 
court did not independently review the evidence presented before the panel in order 
to determine whether in the circuit court's view a prima facie case had not been 
made. Id. at 272 n.3, 503 A.2d at 721 n.3. Nevertheless, the court's holding does 
not seem to permit a circuit court to dismiss a case for failure to arbitrate on the 
ground that no prima facie case was established, even if the circuit court makes this 
determination after reviewing the record of the arbitration proceeding. 
216. Although the case was not cited in Wyndham, the court of appeals indicated in dicta 
in McClurkin v. Maldonado, 304 Md. 225, 233-34, 498 A.2d 626, 630-31 (1985), 
that the rationale applied in Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984), is 
applicable when an award is rendered against a claimant for failure to provide 
discovery. 
217. One of the most common failures of claimants in arbitration proceedings is the fail-
ure to present expert testimony. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 4, at 509-10. 
This should be fatal to the case, except in some very narrow circumstances. See 
Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 622-23, 258 A.2d 595, 598-600 
(1969); cf Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 97-99, 288 A.2d 379, 387-88 (1972) (dis-
cussion of exceptions to rule requiring expert testimony). U~der the holding in 
Wyndham v. Haines, 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986), the failure to present ex-
pert testimony at the arbitration hearing may not be the basis for dismissal of a 
circuit court action for failure to arbitrate. 
Fortunately, a recent amendment of the Act should provide relieffrom a claim-
ant's failure to produce an expert in support of his case. Section 3-2A-04(b) of the 
Act, as amended by 1986 Md. Laws 2353, requires a claimant to provide within 90 
days of filing a claim a certificate of a qualified medical expert that the claim is 
meritorious. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(b) (Supp. 1988). In the 
absence of such a certificate, the claim is to be dismissed. Id.; Robinson v. Pleet, 76 
Md. App. 173,544 A.2d 1 (1988). Since the inclusion of this certificate requirement 
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G. Effect of the Award upon Circuit Court Proceedings 
Once a claimant has fulfilled the condition precedent218 to circuit 
court action by completing arbitration under the Act219 and has properly 
perfected review in circuit court220 by complying with the provisions of 
section 3-2A-06 of the Act, the most important portion of the Act relates 
to the effect of the award upon the circuit court proceeding.221 Section 3-
indicates the importance to the General Assembly of expert testimony in arbitration 
of a claim under the Act, the holding in Bailey should be extended to cover those 
situations in which a case is dismissed for failure to file an expert's certificate. 
218. The Act does not deprive a circuit court of jurisdiction over medical malpractice 
claims; instead it creates a "condition precedent to the institution of a court ac-
tion .... " Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,91,447 A.2d 860,865 (1982) (citing 
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 283-84, 385 A.2d 57, 63, appeal dismissed, 
439 U.S. 805 (1978)); accord Stifter v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19, 25, 488 A.2d 192, 
195 (1985); Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 323 n.l, 452 A.2d 1302, 1305 n.l 
(1982). Despite the fact that the condition precedent is not jurisdictional, it has 
many of the attributes of subject matter jurisdiction. For example, it may be raised 
by the court sua sponte. Compare Resh v. Resh, 271 Md. 133, 137, 314 A.2d 109, 
111 (1974) (discussing subject matter jurisdiction) with Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 91, 447 
A.2d at 865 (discussing condition precedent created by Act). The parties are not 
permitted to agree to waive compliance with the Act's precondition, just as they 
may not agree to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court. Compare Attorney 
Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 690,490 A.2d 1224, 1225 (1985) (dis-
cussing subject matter jurisdiction) with Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 92, 447 A.2d at 865 
(discussing condition precedent created by Act) and McClurkin, 304 Md. at 229-30, 
498 A.2d at 628-29 (same). Cf MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06A 
(Supp. 1988) (statutory addition permitting mutual waiver of arbitration). The con-
dition precedent also may be raised at any time up to final determination of direct 
appeals. Compare Gill v. Physicians & Surgeons Bldg., Inc., 153 Md. 394, 399, 138 
A. 674, 676 (1927) (discussing subject matter jurisdiction) with Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 
92, 447 A.2d at 865 (discussing condition precedent created by Act). 
219. Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38,485 A.2d 265 (1984); see also supra notes 204-217 and 
accompanying text (discussing requirement to arbitrate). 
220. Although the circuit court proceeding commenced by the notice of action to nullify 
is commonly referred to as an appeal, the cases have accurately stated that it is not: 
"Although called an action to nullify, the procedure is not analogous to an appeal 
from an administrative decision. Rather, the action is essentially a separate common 
law tort action with the added element that the arbitration process must be com-
plete." Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 646, 
526 A.2d 46, 49 (1987); see also Wyndham, 305 Md. at 275, 503 A.2d at 723 (Act 
does not abridge or preclude a medical malpractice claimant's right to a common 
law tort action); Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 525,490 A.2d 
720, 723 Gudicial review is not continuation of arbitration proceeding but new, sepa-
rate and distinct litigation), cert. denied, 304 Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). 
This common misperception among practitioners has led to practical problems. 
See infra notes 327-358 and accompanying text (discussing return to arbitration). 
Much of the confusion surrounding this area could be corrected by changing the 
present judicial review procedure. See infra notes 359-375 and accompanying text 
(discussing proposal for modifying judicial review procedure). 
221. This assumes that only judicial effects of the Act have any meaning to the parties. 
Whether the Act provides an effective mechanism for extra-judicial dispute resolu-
tion is beyond the scope of this article, but the proposition is doubtful. See supra 
note 4. Nor does the statement in the text intend to minimize the impact on all the 
parties of the economic costs associated with arbitration. See MacAlister & Scan-
lan, supra note 4, at 503; cf Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 297-98, 385 
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2A-06(d) of the Act states: 
Admissibility of award; presumption of correctness. 
- Unless vacated by the court pursuant to subsection (c), the 
arbitration award is admissible as evidence in the judicial pro-
ceeding. The award shall be presumed to be correct, and the 
burden is on the party rejecting it to prove that it is not 
correct.222 
463 
Section 3-2A-06(d) provides an advantage to the successful party to the 
arbitration proceeding in the subsequent circuit court proceeding.223 
Thus, careful analysis of the operation and scope of section 3-2A-06(d) is 
imperative. 224 
The first discussion of the presumption established by the Act oc-
curred in Attorney General v. Johnson,225 in which the court of appeals 
upheld the Act as constitutional. Rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the 
Act deprived them of their right to a jury trial,226 the court held that the 
presumption was merely a rule of evidence.227 Section 3-2A-06(d) ap-
plied the same burden as the burden of proof in a case in which the Act 
did not apply, because a claimant who had been unsuccessful in arbitra-
tion still bore the burden of proving a case in the circuit court. 228 
Attorney General v. Johnson, arising from a declaratory judgment 
action, not from judicial review of an arbitration award, addressed the 
. operation of the presumption from a claimant's point of view. 229 Hahn v. 
Suburban Hospital Association ,230 however, which arose in the context of 
judicial review of an arbitration award, considered the effect of section 3-
A.2d 57, 70-76, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978) (discussing whether expenses 
and delay consequent to arbitration rises to constitutional dimensions). 
222. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also 
MD. R. BY5. 
223. One of the purposes behind the Act was to decrease the number of malpractice cases 
in the circuit court. See Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 42, 485 A.2d 265,266 (1984); 
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 290, 385 A.2d 57, 66, appeal dismissed, 439 
U.S. 805 (1978). If the parties accept the results of arbitration without judicial re-
view, the Act has achieved its goal and the procedural effect of arbitration thereafter 
is irrelevant because the litigation has terminated. But cf MacAlister & Scanlan, 
supra note 4, at 501 (evidence that judicial review is sought in over fifty percent of 
cases brought under the Act). 
224. See C. Varner, Practice and Procedure Under the Health Care Malpractice Claims 
Act (May, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing questions unanswered by ap-
pellate cases), reprinted in M. SHAR, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW OF 
MARYLAND, at A-26 (1985). 
225. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). 
226. [d. at 291,385 A.2d at 67; see U.S. CONST. amend. VII; MD. CONST. art. XV, § 6. 
227. 282 Md. at 291-95, 385 A.2d at 67-69. 
228. [d. at 293, 385 A.2d at 68. 
229. [d. at 293-94, 385 A.2d at 68-69. The court of appeals did not directly address the 
constitutionality of the Act from the point of view of a health care provider seeking 
judicial review, since it merely held that a claimant would not be able to demon-
strate any prejudice as a result of the Act's presumption. [d. at 293 n.18, 385 A.2d 
at 68 n.18. 
230. 54 Md. App. 685, 461 A.2d 7 (1983). 
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2A-06(d) from a health care provider's point of view.231 
In Hahn, upon the health care provider's filing of a notice of action 
to nullify the award,232 the case proceeded to a jury trial, resulting in a 
verdict in his favor. 233 On appeal, the claimants argued that the health 
care provider had presented insufficient evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of the award.234 The court affirmed the judgment, 
concluding that the health care provider had sustained its burden of 
presenting sufficient evidence to permit the case to go to the jury.23S The 
court noted that section 3-2A-06(d) sets forth no new rule when the 
health care provider receives a favorable award from the panel and the 
claimant appeals; however, when the health care provider loses before 
the panel, section 3-2A-06(d) shifts the burden from the claimant to the 
health care provider.236 
One federal case, Lipscomb v. Memorial Hospital,237 is also instruc-
tive. Lipscomb involved trial court review of an arbitration award ren-
dered in favor of the health care provider.238 On appeal, the health care 
provider argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
that the standard of proof for overcoming the Act's presumption was 
higher than a preponderance of the evidence.239 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the action of the trial court, 
however, holding that Attorney General v. Johnson expressly adopted pre-
ponderance of the evidence as the standard for overcoming the presump-
tion imposed by section 3-2A~06(d).240 
Taken together, Johnson, Hahn and Lipscomb outline the operation 
of section 3-2A-06(d) and indicate that the health care provider has more 
to lose as a result of arbitration. If the claimant is unsuccessful at arbi-
tration, the claimant has the burden of proof and thus is in the same 
position as if arbitration had not occurred.241 On the other hand, if the 
231. [d. at 688, 461 A.2d at 9-10. In Hahn, the plaintiff also rejected the award. [d. For 
a discussion of piecemeal rejection of awards, see supra note 51. 
232. The court of special appeals did not discuss whether the claimants, the health care 
provider, or both, filed an notice of action to nullify. See 54 Md. App. at 688-89, 461 
A.2d at 10; MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988); 
MD. R. BY2(a). 
233. 54 Md. App. at 691, 461 A.2d at 11. The plaintiffs' motion for judgment n.o.v. was 
denied by the circuit court. [d. 
234. [d. at 692, 461 A.2d at 11. 
235. [d. at 694-702, 461 A.2d at 12-16. 
236. [d. at 692, 461 A.2d at 11-12. 
237. 733 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1984). 
238. [d. at 333. 
239. [d. at 338. 
240. [d. (citing Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 293-94, 385 A.2d 57, 68-69, 
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978». 
241. Johnson, 282 Md. at 293, 385 A.2d at 68. This interpretation ignores the ability of 
the health care provider to admit the award into evidence, MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988), and to argue to the jury its pre-
sumptive effect, neither of which would have occurred absent arbitration. Compare 
Hartman v. Cooper, 59 Md. App. 154, 169,474 A.2d 959,967 (1984) (use of award 
which should have been vacated "clearly prejudicial") with Paige v. Manuzak, 57 
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health care provider is unsuccessful at arbitration, the burden of proof 
shifts, and the health care provider is confronted with the reverse of the 
usual burden of proof. 242 
Claimants have argued243 that the Act provides an even greater ad-
vantage to a successful claimant by permitting the claimant to use the 
award as a substitute for a prima facie case, thereby circumventing the 
usual standard of proof.244 This issue involves interpretation of the 
Md. App. 621, 641,471 A.2d 758,768 (1984) (claimants not prejudiced by failure of 
trial court to vacate award). 
242. Prior to the adoption of the Act, Maryland law provided that the plaintiff bore the 
burden of proving each element of a medical negligence case. Johns Hopkins Hosp. 
v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 620, 258 A.2d 595,597-98 (1969); Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 484-85, 187 A.2d 671, 673 (1963). 
243. See Brown v. Meda, 74'Md. App. 331,334-35, 537 A.2d 635, 637-38, cert. granted, 
313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988). 
244. Since the award may not be vacated and thus stripped of its presumptive effect 
solely on the basis of legal and factual errors, this could permit a plaintiff to escape a 
defendant's motion for judgment by relying solely on evidence presented to an arbi-
tration panel, which, if presented to a court outside the context of the Act, would 
not survive a motion for judgment. See also infra notes 316-326 and accompanying 
text (discussing motion to vacate). Compare MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (grounds for vacation of award) and id. § 3-2A-
06(d) (grounds for presumptive effect) with id. § 3-224(b) and O-S Corp. v. Samuel 
A. Kroll, Inc., 29 Md. App. 406, 408-10, 348 A.2d 870, 872 (1975) (standard for 
vacating award under MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-224 (1984 & Supp. 
1988». It is not uncommon for arbitration panel awards to be erroneously based, 
both on fact and law; thus, the results in arbitration are not the same as those that 
would follow a circuit court trial. There are a number of reasons for this, not the 
least of which is the existence of a regulation which states that the arbitration panel 
is not bound by the technical rules of evidence. COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.110; see also 
M. SHAR, supra note 224, at 0-1 to 0-3 (letter from Director discussing relaxed 
rules of evidence in arbitration proceedings governed by the Act). 
Obviously, the presentation of only the award in support of the claimant's case 
would be an infrequent occurrence, because trial strategy would dictate a more com-
plete exposition of evidence in favor of the claim. There are instances, however, in 
which sole presentation of the award could occur or in which the claimant would 
desire to substitute the award for a critical element of the claimant's case, such as 
expert testimony. See Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 
(1969). 
For example, if the Act shifted the burden of production and a panel utilized 
the relaxed rules of evidence permissible in arbitration, as set out in COMAR tit. 1, 
§ 03.01.110, and rendered an award even though the claimant presented no expert 
testimony or proceeded on a theory of res ipsa loquitor, the Act would permit the 
claimant to have the case considered by the jury notwithstanding the insufficiency of 
the evidence. See Genda, 255 Md. 616, 625-26, 258 A.2d 595, 600 (1969) (expert 
testimony required in medical malpractice cases); Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 
463, 138 A.2d 902, 905 (1958) (res ipsa loquitor does not apply in medical malprac-
tice cases); but cf Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 537 A.2d 635, cert. granted, 
313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988) (res ipsa loquitor applicable to medical malpractice 
actions). 
Whether this result would make the Act unconstitutional is beyond the scope 
of this article. Despite the decision in Attorney Gen. V. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 
A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978), which upheld a challenge to the Act 
by a claimant, the Act's constitutionality has not been attacked by a health care 
provider. See id. at 293 n.18, 385 A.2d at 68 n.18 (discussing challenge by claim-
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meaning of the terms "presumption" and "burden of proof" in the Act. 
The legislature's use of those terms in section 3-2A-06(d) is unfortunate, 
since their interpretation is particularly difficult.24s For example, in this 
context, the term burden of proof is imprecise because it actually may 
refer to three separate burdens-the burden of pleading, the burden of 
production, and the burden of persuasion.246 A determination of 
whether the Act is referring to the burden of production or the burden of 
persuasion is critical under certain circumstances.247 
If the Act shifts the burden of production, a prevailing plaintiff at 
arbitration could defeat a defendant's motion for judgment at trial 
merely by introducing the award into evidence.248 On the other hand, if 
section 3-2A-06(d) of the Act shifts the burden of persuasion, the plain-
tiff still would have to present a prima facie case notwithstanding the 
award in order to survive a defendant's motion for judgment.249 
ant). There is little rational basis, however, for exposing a defendant in a medical 
malpractice case to a jury verdict based solely upon an award which may contain 
errors of both fact and law, when any other defendant could have the case dismissed 
prior to consideration by the jury. This might rise to the level of a constitutional 
deprivation of due process. Cj. Big Savage Refractories Corp. v. Geary, 209 Md. 
362,369-70, 121 A.2d 212, 216 (1956) (findings of Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission must be supported by evidence or the action denies due process of law). 
245. "One ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the fam-
ily of legal terms, except its first cousin 'burden of proof.''' C. MCCORMICK, Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 342, at 965 (3d ed. 1984); see also Note, Presumptions in 
Civil Cases: Procedural Effects Under Maryland Law in State and Federal Forums, 5 
U. BALT. L. REV. 301 (1976). The difficulties inherent in deciphering the appropri-
ate meaning of these terms are augmented by the use of the terms as substitutes for 
each other. See L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 301.1, at 184. See generally id. 
§§ 300.1 to 301.5, at 132-232 (discussing the use of the terms "presumption" and 
"burden of proof" under Maryland law). 
246. L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 300.1, at 132 & n.1. 
247. It is readily apparent that the Act is not referring to the burden of pleading. See id. 
§ 300.3, at 142-43 (discussion of burden of pleading). Both the Act and the BY 
Rules clearly delineate the allocation of the burden of pleading. MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a), (b) (1984 & Supp. 1988); MD. R. BY2, BY4. Put-
ting aside any minimal burden of pleading imposed by the requirement of filing a 
notice of action to nullify, the burden generally falls on the claimant to plead prop-
erly a cause of action in the complaint. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-06(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988); MD. R. BY2. If a claimant fails to plead a prima 
facie case in the complaint, the case should be dismissed, notwithstanding the 
award. 
248. Technically, this would not constitute a shifting of the burden of production, be-
cause a true shift of that burden would require the health care provider to go for-
ward with evidence in the absence of any action by the claimant. Because the 
claimant may easily introduce the award into evidence, the effect would be similar. 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (award 
admissible in evidence). 
Analyzed another way, proceeding in this fashion would give the award the 
status of a true evidentiary presumption. Cj. L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 301.3, at 
204 (discussion of true evidentiary presumptions). Proof of the basic fact, i.e., arbi-
tration with an award in favor of the claimant, would shift the burden of proving the 
non-existence of the presumed fact, i.e., negligence, to the health care provider. 
249. The award would still be admissible in evidence. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
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Although not distinguishing between the various components of the 
burden of proof, in Brown v. Meda,250 the court of special appeals de-
cided that a claimant could not defeat a motion for judgment or a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict solely on the basis of an arbi-
tration award in favor of the claimant.2SJ Brown involved judicial review 
of an arbitration panel award against a sole health care provider.252 Af-
ter a jury verdict in favor of the claimants, the circuit court granted the 
health care provider's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on the ground that the claimants' case was based on res ipsa !oquitor.253 
On appeal, the claimants argued that such a motion could never be 
granted against a claimant who prevailed at arbitration and who did not 
reject the award.254 
As courts in earlier decisions have done,255 the Brown court analo-
gized the effect of section 3-2A-06(d) to the operation of section 56(c) of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act.256 The court of special appeals con-
ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988); cf Su v. Weaver, 313 Md. 370, 545 A.2d 
692 (1988) (admissibility of award). 
250. 74 Md. App. 331, 537 A.2d 635, cert. granted, 313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988). 
251. Id. at 335, 537 A.2d at 637. 
252. Id. at 333-34, 537 A.2d at 636-37. 
253. Id. at 334, 537 A.2d at 637. But cf Hans V. Franklin Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 
329, 347 A.2d 905 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 744 (1976) (res ipsa loquitor not 
available in medical malpractice actions). 
254.Id. 
255. Attorney Gen. V. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 293, 385 A.2d 57,68, appeal dismissed, 439 
U.S. 805 (1978); Hahn V. Surburban Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 692-93, 461 
A.2d 7, 12 (1983). 
256. Brown, 74 Md. App. at 334, 537 A.2d at 637. Although instructive, a comparison of 
section 3-2A-06(d) of the Act with section 56(c) of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(c) (1985), reveals an imperfect match. See 
Bailey V. Woel, 302 Md. 38,43 n.4, 485 A.2d 265, 267 n.4 (1984). Thus, there may 
be reasons for a court to interpret the two sections differently. 
First, the language of the sections is different. Compare MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988) ("presumed to be correct") 
with MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(c) (1985) ("prima facie correct"). 
Second, the Act merely creates a condition precedent to the exercise of a com-
mon law action, see supra note 218, whereas the Workmen's Compensation Act 
establishes a comprehensive scheme of strict liability, largely abrogating the com-
mon law in the area and severely limiting the issues for decision. See generally M. 
PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 1-1, at 1-2 (1977). 
Third, the administration panels established by the Act are not administrative 
agencies created to develop an expertise in a particular area, Attorney Gen. V. John-
son, 282 Md. 274, 285, 385 A.2d 57, 63, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978), 
whereas the Workmen's Compensation Commission most assuredly is. 
Next, the Act makes no provision for the admission of any portion of the rec-
ord of the arbitration proceeding into evidence, other than the award, absent com-
pliance with the usual rules of evidence. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 3-2A-
06(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988); cf id. § 3-2A-06(e) (use of discovery materials). The 
record of the hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Commission, however, 
is admissible in evidence on an appeal from that body. See, e.g., Yellow Cab CO. V. 
Bisasky, 11 Md. App. 491, 503, 275 A.2d 193, 200, cert. denied, 262 Md. 751 
(1971). 
Finally, except for the operation of section 3-2A-06(d) of the Act, an action 
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eluded that a circuit court is not prohibited from deciding a case as a 
matter of law in favor of the health care provider, even in the face of an 
arbitration award in favor of a elaimant.2S7 Application of interpreta-
tions of the analogous provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
establishes both that section 3-2A-06(d) operates to shift the burden of 
persuasion, not the burden of production,258 and that a circuit court 
should not permit an otherwise insufficient case to be submitted to the 
jury upon the production of evidence consisting solely of a favorable arbi-
tration award. 
Moreover, decisions interpreting the Workmen's Compensation Act 
consistently have upheld the trial court's power to determine questions of 
law by granting motions for summary judgment259 and motions for judg-
ment.260 Only the commission's factual determinations are accorded the 
commenced after arbitration proceeds like any other tort action, whereas an appeal 
from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is "informal and 
summary." MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (1985). 
Despite these differences, both the court of appeals and the court of special 
appeals have made clear that the two sections are to be interpreted in the same 
fashion. Johnson, 282 Md. at 293, 385 A.2d at 68; Hahn, 54 Md. App. at 692-93, 
461 A.2d at 12; see also Bailey, 302 Md. at 43 n.4, 485 A.2d at 267 n.4 (1984) 
(comparison of Act to Workmen's Compensation Act for other purposes). See gen-
erally M. PRESSMAN, supra, §§ 4-22 to 4-26, at 385-441 (1977 & Supp. 1980) (com-
pilation of cases dealing with the operation of section 56(c) of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act). 
257. 74 Md. App. at 335-36, 537 A.2d at 637-38 (citing Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 45, 
187 A. 887, 890 (1936) (decision under Workmen's Compensation Act». The 
Brown court went on, however, to reverse the circuit court's holding that the claim-
ants' case rested on the kind of res ipsa loquitor evidence barred by Hans v. Franklin 
Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 329, 347 A.2d 905 (1975),cert. denied, 276 Md. 744 
(1976). Brown, 74 Md. App. at 346, 537 A.2d at 642-43. The court noted that to the 
extent its decision was inconsistent with the holding in Hans, the holding in Hans is 
overruled. [d. 
258. The court of appeals has long upheld the presumption of correctness of decisions of 
the Workmen's Compensation Commission and has placed the burden of persuasion 
on the party attacking the decision. See, e.g., Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 245 
Md. 433, 437-38, 226 A.2d 253, 256 (1967); Krell v. Maryland Drydock Co., 184 
Md. 428, 435, 41 A.2d 502, 505 (1945); Stewart & Co. v. Howell, 136 Md. 423, 434, 
110 A. 899, 902 (1920); see also, e.g., Community Realty Co. v. Siskos, 31 Md. App. 
99, 105-06,354 A.2d 181, 184-85 (l976); Dent v. Cahill, 18 Md. App. 117, 123-24, 
305 A.2d 233, 237 (1973); Carling Brewing Co. v. Belzner, 15 Md. App. 406, 410-
11,291 A.2d 175, 178 (1972); M. PRESSMAN, supra note 256, § 4-25, at 433-41. The 
court of appeals and the court of special appeals have specifically labelled this bur-
den the "burden of persuasion." See, e.g., Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 
134, 140,265 A.2d 256, 259 (1970) (citing Williams Const. Co. v. Bohlen, 189 Md. 
576, 580, 56 A.2d 694, 696 (1948»; Abell, 245 Md. at 437-38, 226 A.2d at 265; Rose 
v. State, 26 Md. App. 358, 363, 338 A.2d 311,314 (1975); Carling Brewing Co., 15 
Md. App. at 410-11,291 A.2d at 178; see also M. PRESSMAN, supra note 256, § 4-
25(2), at 437-40. 
259. Dawson's Charter Service v. Chin, 68 Md. App. 433, 440, 511 A.2d 1138, 1142 
(1986); Maloney v. Carling Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 52 Md. App. 556, 560,451 A.2d 
343,345 (1982); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176,430 A.2d 122, 
125 (l981). 
260. See, e.g., Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 457-58, 385 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1978); Jewel 
Tea Co. v. Blamble, 227 Md. 1,4, 174 A.2d 764, 765-66 (1961); Albright v. Penn-
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presumption of correctness, whereas the trial court retains the right to 
consider the legal issues and the sufficiency of the evidence. 261 The deci-
sion in Brown merely follows these well-established principles. 
Thus, the presumption of correctness of the arbitration award shifts 
the burden of persuasion to the party seeking judicial review.262 Never-
theless, this presumption does not obviate the plaintiff's burden of 
presenting a prima facie case in the circuit court. In all circuit court 
cases brought after arbitration pursuant to the Act, regardless of whether 
the claimant or the health care provider prevailed before the panel, the 
usual order of proof should apply.263 The plaintiff should submit, in ad-
dition to the award,264 evidence that establishes a prima facie case. Ab-
sent such evidence, the circuit court should dismiss the case.26S The jury 
would hear evidence in a manner similar to other tort cases and would be 
instructed about how the Act operates. Section 3-2A-06(d) would have 
no effect on the proceedings until the jury is instructed266 and argument 
sylvania R.R., 183 Md. 421, 435-36, 37 A.2d 870, 876-77, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 
(1944); Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md. App. 269, 273, 511 A.2d 541, 543 
(1986); see also M. PRESSMAN, supra note 256, § 4-24(5), at 432. 
261. Decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Commission may not be upheld if they 
are based upon an erroneous construction of law. Trotta v. County Car Center, 
Inc., 292 Md. 660, 662, 441 A.2d 343, 344 (1982); Montgomery County Police 
Dept. v. Jennings, 49 Md. App. 246, 251, 431 A.2d 721, 724 (1981); cf infra notes 
316-326 and accompanying text (discussing standard for vacating award). Similarly, 
the operation of section 56(c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in allocating 
the burden of proof has no application where there is a question of law instead of 
fact. Greenwalt v. Brauns Bldg. Specialties Corp., 203 Md. 313, 100 A.2d 804 
(1953); Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 187 A. 887 (1936) (cited in Brown v. Meda, 
74 Md. App. 331, 335, 537 A.2d 635, 637, cert. granted, 313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 
(1988»; Symons v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 10 Md. App. 498, 500-01, 271 A.2d 398, 
399-400 (1970). 
262. This is also the view of one of the leading scholars on the law of evidence in Mary-
land. L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 301.1, at 184-85 & n.15. The author provides 
another reason why the Act shifts the burden of persuasion instead of the burden of 
production: although presumptions, which restate the allocation of the burden of 
persuasion, are rarely mentioned to the jury, statements to the jury concerning the 
burden of production are "never appropriate." Id. at 188-89 & nn.36-37. Since the 
award is admissible in evidence, see supra note 222, only by interpreting the Act to 
shift the burden of persuasion can the Act abide by the general rule stated by Profes-
sor McLain. 
263. See L. McLAIN, supra note 51, at § 300.2, at 135-36 (discussing the usual order of 
proof). . 
264. The award admitted into evidence should include the decision of the panel on sepa-
rate and distinct issues of liability, and these decisions should be made known to the 
jury. Su v. Weaver, 313 Md: 370, 382, 545 A.2d 692, 698 (1988). However, any 
explanation of the findings may not be presented to the jury. Id. In order to achieve 
this result, counsel should request an award from the panel which identifies those 
separate findings. Id. 
265. MD. R. 2-519; Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 343, 537 A.2d 635, 641, cert. 
granted, 313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988); cf Wyndham v. Haines, 305 Md. 269, 277 
& n.6, 503 A.2d 719, 723 & n.6 (1986) (implicitly approving circuit court use of 
motions to dismiss or motions for judgment to dispose of cases brought after arbi-
tration under the Act). 
266. The Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 27:2 provides: 
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takes place. 267 
H Motions to Modify, Correct or Vacate 
The only way to avoid the operation of section 3-2A-06(d) of the 
Act is to have the award modified, corrected or vacated.268 Motions to 
modify, correct or vacate are governed not only by section 3-2A-06(c) of 
the Act, but also by provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration 
Act269 incorporated by reference into the Act.270 Therefore, examination 
BURDEN OF PROOF A Maryland statute requires a medical malprac-
tice claim to be submitted to arbitration before the matter may be tried by 
this court. Either party may appeal the arbitrator's decision to this court 
and if such appeal is made, the matter is tried allover. The claim in this 
case was submited to arbitration and it was decided that (describe the arbi-
trator's decision) [injured party] [insert the identity of the health care pro-
vider] has appealed from that decision. You are not bound by the 
arbitrator's decision. However, under the law that decision is presumed to 
be correct and the [injured party] [insert the identity of the health care 
provider] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the decision is wrong. In meeting this burden, the [injured party] 
[insert the name of the health care provider] may rely on the same, less or 
more evidence than was presented to the arbitrator. 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 51, MPH 27:2. Except for the use 
throughout the instruction of the improper and potentially confusing word "ap-
peal," the instruction is a correct exposition of the Act's provisions. A variation of 
this instruction was used by the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland and approved by the Fourth Circuit. Lipscomb v. Memorial Hosp., 733 
F.2d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 1984). The pattern instruction is similar to the one for 
appeals from decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 51, MPH 30:3. 
267. Although the usual order of proof shall always apply, the order of argument should 
follow the burden of persuasion. See L. McLAIN, supra note 51, § 300.2, at 136; see 
also American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 384-86, 97 A. 999, 1000 (1916) 
(decision under analogous Workmen's Compensation Act). If the health care pro-
vider was unsuccessful in the arbitration proceeding, he should have the opportunity 
to argue first, with rebuttal, rather than the plaintiff. This somewhat unusual proce-
dure is necessitated by the burden-shifting provisions of the Act. 
268. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Sec-
tion 3-2A-06(d) of the Act provides that its provisions are applicable to an award 
"[u]nless vacated by the court pursuant to subsection (c) .... " Id. § 3-2A-06(d). 
269. Id. §§ 3-201 to 3-234. 
270. Section 3-2A-06(c) of the Act states: 
Modification. correction or vacation of award by court - An allegation that 
an award is improper because of any ground stated in § 3-223(b) or § 3-
224(b)(I), (2), (3), or (4) or § 3-2A-05(h) of this article shall be made by 
preliminary motion, and shall be determined by the court without a jury 
prior to trial. Failure to raise such a defense by pretrial preliminary mo-
tion shall constitute a waiver of it. If the court finds that a condition 
stated in § 3-223(b) exists, or that the award was not appropriately modi-
fied in accordance with § 3-2A-05(h) of this subtitle, it shall modify or 
correct the award. If the rejecting party still desires to proceed with judi-
cial review, the modified or corrected award shall be substituted for the 
original award. If the court finds that a condition stated in § 3-224(b)(I), 
(2), (3), or (4) exists, it shall vacate the award, and trial of the case shall 
proceed as if there had been no award. 
Id. § 3-2A-06(c). 
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of both acts is required. 
The first question raised by section 3-2A-06(c) is that of timing. In 
order for a circuit court to modify, correct or vacate an award, a party 
must file a "preliminary motion."271 Failure to raise by "pretrial prelimi-
nary motion" any of the grounds for modifying, correcting or vacating 
an award is a waiver of those grounds.272 Unfortunately, the Act uses 
descriptive terms-"preliminary motion" and "pretrial preliminary mo-
tion" -which have no reference in either the BY Rules or the balance of 
the Maryland Rules of Procedure.273 None of the cases discussing sec-
tion 3-2A-06(c) interprets the term "preliminary." Since the Act was 
adopted before the wholesale amendment of the Maryland Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Act may be referring to the now obsolete motion raising pre-
liminary objection.274 If so, a motion to modify, correct or vacate an 
award now would have to be a component of a motion to dismiss, and 
the grounds would be comparable to those other defenses which are 
waived if not presented in that pleading.275 Although careful counsel 
may use this approach, there seems to be little justification for it. Rather, 
a common sense approach would allow the motion to be filed anytime 
prior to trial or the grounds therefor to be raised in the answer, permit-
ting the court to determine the effect of the award properly at trial. 276 
Under the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, a court may modify 
an award upon any of the following grounds: (1) the award contains an 
evident miscalculation or mistake;277 (2) the arbitrators have awarded 
upon a matter not submitted to them;278 or (3) the award is otherwise 
imperfect in form.279 If the circuit court makes the determination that 
271. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988). The cir-
cuit court may partially vacate the award, permitting the Act's presumption to ap-
ply to some, but not all, of the health care providers. Paige v. Manuzak, 57 Md. 
App. 621, 640-41, 471 A.2d 758, 768, eert. denied, 300 Md. 154, 476 A.2d 772 
(1984). 
272. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
273. Since the BY Rules were adopted to implement the provisions of the Act, one logi-
cally would expect the procedure for filing the motions required by section 3-2A-
06(c) to be contained therein. 
274. MD. R. 323, superseded by, MD. R. 2-322. The Maryland Rules of Procedure were 
substantially revised effective July 1, 1984. 11 Md. Reg. 9, at S-1 (1984). 
275. MD. R. 2-322(a) (defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, 
insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process must be made by pre-
liminary motion or they are waived). 
276. See also supra notes 218-267 and accompanying text (discussing effect of award); ef. 
MD. R. 2-322(b), 2-323(a) (defenses which may be raised in either preliminary mo-
tion or answer). 
277. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-223(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
278. [d. § 3-223(b)(2). This occurrence is unlikely in a proceeding under the Act, where, 
in contrast to contractual arbitration p,oceedings, the issues are fairly standardized. 
See id. § 3-2A-05(e); COMAR tit. 1, § 03.01.12 (list of determinations to be made 
by arbitration panel). 
279. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-223(b)(3) (1984). Again, this is unlikely in 
health claims arbitration proceedings. See supra note 278. Furthermore, the Direc-
tor provides the panel with a form to use. But ef. Su v. Weaver, 313 Md. 370, 545 
A.2d 692 (1988) (award should contain decision on separate and distinct issues of 
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one of these conditions is met, it must modify or correct the award, and 
the modified or corrected award is substituted for the original award if 
the rejecting party still desires to proceed.280 
In 1987, the General Assembly added the panel's failure to modify 
the award in accordance with section 3-2A-05(h) to the grounds for mod-
ification or correction of an award.281 Section 3-2A-05(h) authorizes the 
panel to reduce damages to the extent that a claimant is compensated by 
collateral sources.282 The circuit court may review the panel's determi-
nation for purposes of evaluating the award's presumptive effect283 and 
has similar authority to reduce a jury verdict or grant a new trial.284 
The grounds for vacating an award are located in the Maryland 
Uniform Arbitration Act. An arbitration award may be vacated upon 
any ofthe following grounds: (1) the award was procured by fraud, cor-
ruption or undue means;28S (2) there was evident partiality by an arbitra-
tor;286 (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;287 or (4) the arbitrators 
conducted the hearing so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a 
party.288 This last ground includes failure by the arbitrators to postpone 
the hearing in appropriate circumstances and their refusal to hear mate-
rial evidence.289 If the award is vacated, the case proceeds as if no award 
had been made. 290 
The Maryland appellate courts have not considered the standards 
for modifying an award. They have interpreted substantively the various 
statutory provisions for vacating an award on three occasions.291 Two of 
liability). According to the court of special appeals, the Director has the authority 
to return an imperfect award to the panel for correction. Osheroff v. Chestnut 
Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 526-28,490 A.2d 720, 724, cert. denied, 304 Md. 
163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). But see Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 286, 
385 A.2d 57, 64, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978) (director exercises no judi-
cial function). 
280. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
281. 1987 Md. Laws 2721 (codified at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) 
(1984 & Supp. 1988». This amendment only applies to actions arising from events 
occurring on or after July 1, 1987. 1987 Md. Laws 2721, 2732. 
282. See generally P. CULLEN, J. EYLER, G. HOLTZ, W. KITZES, A. ROISMAN, G. 
SHADOAN, M. TRAINER & I. WEISS, MARYLAND TORT DAMAGES 14-15 (rev. ed. 
1985) (collateral source rule). 
283. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(h) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also id. 
§ 3-2A-06(c). 
284. [d. § 3-2A-06(f). 
285. [d. § 3-224(b)(1). 
286. [d. § 3-224(b)(2). 
287. [d. § 3-224(b)(3). 
288. [d. § 3-224(b)(4). See generally id. § 3-213 (outlining procedural due process 
requirements). 
289. [d. § 3-224(b)(4) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
290. [d. § 3-2A-06(c). But cf infra notes 327-358 and accompanying text (discussing 
return of case to arbitration). 
291. In addition, in Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 336 n.l, 537 A.2d 635, 638 n.l, 
cert. granted, 313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988), the court of special appeals decided 
that a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence before an arbitration panel may not be 
raised to vacate the award. 
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the cases dealt with the question of partiality by an arbitrator,292 and the 
other case dealt with a claim that the panel failed to hear relevant 
evidence. 293 
Section 3-224(b)(2) of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act pro-
vides that an award should be vacated if an arbitrator exhibits "evident 
partiality."294 In Hartman v. Cooper,29S a health care provider acting as 
a panel member failed' to disclose information from which bias might 
have been inferred.296 Although the health care provider submitted an 
affidavit in which he asserted that he was not biased,297 and although the 
decision against the claimant was a unanimous one,298 the court of spe-
cial appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, which had refused to 
vacate the award.299 The court of special appeals held that "a showing of 
actual bias or proof of improper conduct is not necessary; all that is re-
quired is an appearance of possible bias. "300 
The court of appeals in Wyndham v. Haines 301 questioned the stan-
dard applied by the court of special appeals in Hartman. In Wyndham, 
the claimant attacked the impartiality of a panel chairperson, alleging 
that the chairperson's representation of two medical malpractice claim-
ants in cases in which defense counsel was the same as in Wyndham 
might create bias on his part.302 A motion to recuse the chairperson was 
filed but never decided, and the panel rendered a unanimous decision in 
favor of the health care provider.303 The circuit court denied the petition 
to vacate, deciding that there was no basis for concluding that the arbi-
292. Wyndham v. Haines, 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986); Hartman v. Cooper, 59 
Md. App. 154,474 A.2d 959, cerro denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 (1984) (disap-
proved to the extent inconsistent with the court's opinion in Wyndham, 305 Md. at 
279,503 A.2d at 725); see also MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(2) 
(1984 & Supp. 1988). 
293. Golub V. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147,520 A.2d 394, cerro denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 
954 (1987); see also MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(4) (1984 & 
Supp. 1988). 
294. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Section 3-
224(b)(2) of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act is made applicable to proceed-
ings under the Act by section 3-2A-06(c). [d. § 3-2A-06(c); see Attorney Gen. V. 
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 297, 385 A.2d 57, 70, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). 
295. 59 Md. App. 154, 474 A.2d 959 (1983), cerro denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 
(1984). 
296. Specifically, the health care provider failed to disclose that he had been sued previ-
ously for malpractice and that he had testified as a medical witness. [d. at 158-59, 
474 A.2d at 960. The health care provider offered an innocent explanation for his 
failure to disclose this information. [d. at 159-60, 474 A.2d at 962-63. 
297. [d. at 160,474 A.2d at 962. 
298. [d. at 158,474 A.2d at 962. 
299. [d. at 169, 474 A.2d at 967. The jury was instructed that the panel's decision was 
presumed correct and rendered a verdict against the claimant. [d. at 162,474 A.2d 
at 963. 
300. [d. at 168,474 A.2d at 967; see also McKinney Drilling CO. V. Mach I. Ltd. Part-
nership, 32 Md. App. 205, 359 A.2d 100 (1976). 
301. 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986). 
302. [d. at 277-78, 503 A.2d at 724. 
303. [d. at 278, 503 A.2d at 724. 
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trator was biased. 304 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to vacate 
the award,305 finding that the claimants "failed to adduce the required 
proof of 'evident partiality' ... [which] requires more than speculation 
and bald allegations of bias."306 Rather, a party seeking to vacate an 
award "must prove facts sufficient to permit an inference that there was 
indeed partiality by an arbitrator. "307 Although not specifically rejecting 
the standard of proof applied in Hartman, the court of appeals criticized 
the decision in that case. 308 
Golub v. Spivey 309 addressed a circuit court's denial of a motion to 
vacate based on claims that the panel refused to hear evidence material to 
the controversy31O and failed to postpone a case for good cause.311 These 
claims arose out of a discovery dispute, as a result of which the panel 
chairperson granted a motion in limine filed by the claimant on the eve of 
the hearing and precluded the health care provider from presenting ex-
pert testimony.312 The chairperson also denied the health care provider's 
motion for a continuance.313 The circuit court ultimately denied the mo-
304. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724-25. 
305. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 725. 
306. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724-25. 
307. Id. In Wyndham, the court of appeals almost mandated the use of affidavits, or 
even testimony, to prove partiality. Id. at 279 nn. 10-11,503 A.2d at 725 nn. 10-11. 
Of course, in Hartman, the claimants presented testimony, and the health care pro-
vider panel member provided an affidavit. Hartman v. Cooper, 59 Md. App. 154, 
159-60, 474 A.2d 959, 962 (1983), cert. denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 (1984). 
How Hartman would have been decided under the standard employed by the 
Wyndham court is unclear, since the trial court in Hartman required bias to be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence, the incorrect standard under either deci-
sion. Id. at 161, 474 A.2d at 963. 
308. The court of appeals stated that "[i]n reaching this conclusion we are aware of Hart-
man v. Cooper. To the extent that Hartman is inconsistent with this opinion, it is 
disapproved." 305 Md. at 279, n.9, 503 A.2d at 725 n.9 (citation omitted). 
309. 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394 (1987). 
310. See also Paige v. Manuzak, 57 Md. App. 621, 471 A.2d 758, cert. denied, 300 Md. 
154, 476 A.2d 722 (1984). In Paige, an arbitration panel permitted a physician 
expert witness to testify against one health care provider but not against another, 
presumably on the ground that the expert's specialty did not qualify him to testify 
against the second health care provider. 57 Md. App. at 640, 471 A.2d at 767-68. 
But cf Wolfinger v. Frey, 223 Md. 184, 188-90, 162 A.2d 745,747-48 (1960) (physi-
cian testifying as medical expert not necessarily limited to any area of specializa-
tion). The circuit court vacated the award in favor of the health care provider 
against whom testimony was excluded, and the court of special appeals affirmed. 57 
Md. App. at 640-41, 471 A.2d at 768; see also supra note 270. Apparently, no one 
raised the issue whether the panel chairperson's action was appropriate, and the 
court of special appeals never addressed the issue. 
311. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(4) (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
312. 70 Md. App. at 160, 520 A.2d at 400-01. In Spivey, the panel chairperson had 
established a deadline for naming experts. Although the health care provider did 
not designate any experts on his behalf, he intended to utilize experts designated by 
other parties as his own. Id. at 151, 160-61 n.4, 520 A.2d at 396, 400-01 n.4. Nev-
ertheless, the panel chairperson granted claimant's motion in limine. Id. at 160, 520 
A.2d at 400. 
313. Id. at 151, 520 A.2d at 396. 
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tion to vacate,314 and the court of special appeals affirmed, holding that 
the chairperson's action was appropriate as a discovery sanction.3ls 
Thus, at least under the holding in Spivey, attacks on awards arising 
under section 3-224(b)(4) are fairly circumscribed, affording the panel a 
large amount of discretion. 
An important ground for vacating an award contained in the Mary-
land Uniform Arbitration Act that has not been addressed by an appel-
late tribunal in the context of health claims arbitration is that the 
members of the arbitration panel "exceeded their powers."316 Although 
at first blush this provision seems to provide a broad basis for vacating an 
award, the court of special appeals has interpreted its scope narrowly, at 
least in the area of consensual arbitration.317 An arbitration award may 
not be vacated under section 3-224(b)(3) unless it is "completely irra-
tional."318 A circuit court properly applying this standard must defer to 
the decision of the arbitrators and may not vacate an award even if it 
contains errors of law, failures to understand or apply the law properly, 
or arbitrary interpretations of documents.319 
The cases adopting the "completely irrational" standard arose in the 
context of agreements to arbitrate,320 and the standard is designed to fur-
ther the goal of private, rather than judicial, dispute resolution.321 In 
that context, the standard seeks to limit parties to their contractually 
agreed remedy of arbitration. By contrast, the Act legislatively imposes 
arbitration on the parties322 and specifically provides for continuation of 
the dispute in the judicial arena.323 Moreover, because the Act gives the 
award presumptive eifect,324 application of the "completely irrational" 
standard may operate to allow shifting of the burden of proof based upon 
an award that contains errors of fact or law or both32s-a particularly 
harsh result. Although the Act incorporates by reference section 3-
314. Id. at 153, 520 A.2d at 397; see also supra note 170 (discussing procedural history of 
Spivey). 
315. 70 Md. App. at 160-61, 520 A.2d at 400-01. See generally MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE A!"'N. § 3-2A-05(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (giving panel chairperson authority 
to decide all prehearing procedural issues). 
316. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also id. 
at § 3-2A-06(c) (incorporating § 3-224(b)(3) into the Act). 
317. Southern Md. Hosp. Center v. Edward M. Crough, Inc., 48 Md. App. 401, 407-09, 
427 A.2d 1051, 1055-56, cert. denied, 290 Md. 721 (1981); O-S Corp. V. Samuel A. 
Kroll, Inc., 29 Md. App. 406, 408-10, 348 A.2d 870, 872-73 (1975). 
318. Southern Md. Hosp. Center, 48 Md. App. at 408, 427 A.2d at 1055; O-S Corp., 29 
Md. App. at 408-09, 348 A.2d at 872-73. 
319. Southern Md. Hosp. Center, 48 Md. App. at 407-08, 427 A.2d at 1055. This defer-
ence does not apply to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel to 
hear the dispute. Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. V. Barclay Townhouse Assoc., 313 
Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). 
320. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-202 (1984). 
321. See Southern Md. Hosp. Center, 48 Md. App. at 406, 427 A.2d at 1054. 
322. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
323. Id. § 3-2A-06. 
324. Id. § 3-2A-06(d); see supra notes 218-267 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 244 (discussing relaxed rules of evidence in arbitration). 
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224(b)(3) of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, the "completely ir-
rational" standard is not legislatively mandated, and appellate courts are 
free to fashion a different standard applicable to proceedings under the 
Act. 326 
L Return to the Arbitration Panel 
The question frequently arises whether a circuit court may remand a 
case to the arbitration panel in the event of an error in the arbitration 
process. The Act makes no provision for remand from the circuit court. 
Under the Act, once the arbitration process has been concluded, the par-
ties' recourse is the judicial system.327 If an error has occurred in the 
arbitration process, the appropriate remedy under the Act is for the cir-
cuit court to vacate the award and proceed as if arbitration had never 
taken place.328 This remedy is consistent with the policy of the Act, 
which provides for a trial de novo in the circuit court and not a review of 
the record of the arbitration proceeding.329 The court of special appeals 
and the court of appeals both have considered the question of remand. 330 
In Schwartz v. Ljlfy,331 the plaintiffs filed an action in circuit court 
for alleged malpractice which occurred in 1978.332 The defendant filed a 
preliminary motion seeking dismissal of the case on the ground that the 
plaintiffs failed to comply with the arbitration provisions of the Act. 333 
The circuit court denied the motion and transferred the case to the 
HeAO for arbitration.334 The court of special appeals reversed the deci-
sion of the circuit court, holding that arbitration was a prerequisite to 
circuit court action and that, absent arbitration, a circuit court must dis-
miss rather than transfer the case.335 Thus, at least in the case where 
arbitration has never been initiated, remand is not an appropriate cure 
326. The General Assembly should seriously consider permitting an award to be vacated 
based upon errors of law. On the other hand, the disadvantage of allowing a circuit 
court to review the arbitration proceedings for errors of law is that this might im-
pose a significant burden on the court and an expense on the parties for transcripts. 
Whether the courts and the parties already bear these expenses in attempts to have 
the award vacated under the present grounds is a matter for the legislature to 
consider. 
327. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
328. Id. § 3-2A-06(c); see supra notes 268-326 and accompanying text (explaining diffi-
culties inherent in this proposition). 
329. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 296, 385 A.2d 57, 70, appeal dismissed, 439 
U.S. 805 (1978). 
330. See Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 Md. App. 350, 362, 492 A.2d 946, 952 (1985) (citing 
cases discussing remand). 
331. 53 Md. App. 318, 452 A.2d 1302 (1982). 
332. Id. at 319, 452 A.2d at 1303. 
333. Id. at 320, 452 A.2d at 1303; see also supra notes 204-217 and accompanying text 
(discussing necessity of arbitration). 
334. 53 Md. App. at 320, 452 A.2d at 1303. 
335. Id. at 320-24, 452 A.2d at 1304-06. The court cited and followed the holding in 
Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982), in making its decision. 
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for defective filing.336 Schwartz, however, did not address remand in the 
traditional sense, i.e., return of a proceeding to a lower tribunal to cor-
rect an error made below. 
In Stifler v. Weiner,337 the panel chairperson, acting alone, entered 
summary judgment against the claimants.338 On appeal from circuit 
court review, in dicta, the court of special appeals criticized the chairper-
son's practice of granting summary judgment without the participation 
of the other panel members.339 Despite this defect340 in the arbitration 
process, the court stated that "[ilt would, at this stage of the proceeding, 
be silly to remand the case all the way to the panel so that it could per-
functorily do what, as a matter of law, must be done."341 By this lan-
guage, the Stifler decision seems to grant an imprimatur to remanding a 
case to arbitration. 342 
The court of appeals was faced with a comparable situation in Mc-
Clurkin v. Maldonado. 343 As in Stifler, the McClurkin court considered 
a panel chairperson's unilateral dismissal of a case344 at a time when he 
336. Nor is the converse true. The Act makes no provision for "transfer" of an improp-
erly filed arbitration proceeding to the circuit court. Although failure to initiate 
arbitration proceedings is unlikely now that the Act has been in existence for over 
ten years, it still may occur. Compare MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 
(1984 & Supp. 1988) and Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917) (dis-
covery rule) with MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984 & Supp. 1988) 
(absolute five-year limitation on medical malpractice claims). 
Such a case should be dismissed by the arbitration panel, just as the circuit 
court should dismiss any attempts by the claimant to seek judicial review under the 
Act. The claimant's proper remedy under those circumstances is to file a complaint 
in the circuit court. Although a proper filing under the Act tolls the statute of 
limitations, the filing of an arbitration claim in a case not governed by the Act 
should not accomplish this goal. Id. § 5-109; see Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 
257 A.2d 421 (1969) (filing in wrong forum does not toll limitations); Barnhart v. 
Western Md. Ry., 41 F. Supp. 898 (D. Md. 1941) (same). 
337. 62 Md. App. 19, 488 A.2d 192 (1985). 
338. Id. at 21-22, 488 A.2d at 193. Whether the motion was based on the claimants' 
indication that no expert witness would be called on their behalf, and thus that they 
could not present a prima facie case or whether the motion was based on the statute 
oflimitations is not clear. Id. at 22, 488 A.2d at 193-94 (discussing Johns Hopkins 
Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616,258 A.2d 595 (1969»; cf Baysinger v. Schmid Prods. 
Co., 307 Md. 361, 514 A.2d 1 (1986); O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 503 A.2d 
1313 (1986) (limiting the availability of summary judgment when the defense is stat-
ute of limitations). 
339. 62 Md. App. at 23-25, 488 A.2d 194-95. 
340. The Act has since been amended to permit the practice criticized by the court of 
special appeals. See supra note 62. 
341. 62 Md. App. at 25, 488 A.2d at 195. The court of special appeals assumed in its 
statement that the arbitration process scrupulously follows such rules of law or that 
they may be easily corrected if the arbitration process does not. Cf supra notes 244 
(discussing relaxed rules of evidence), 316-326 and accompanying text (discussing 
principle that awards may not be vacated for errors of law). 
342. See Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 Md. App. 337, 362,492 A.2d 946, 952 (1985). 
343. 304 Md. 225, 498 A.2d 626 (l985). 
344. Id. at 226, 498 A.2d at 627. The dismissal in McClurkin was for failure to provide 
discovery. Id. 
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did not have the power to do so on his own. 345 Although the case other-
wise may have been moot,346 the court of appeals determined that it was 
not, because the chairperson had denied a motion for reconsideration of 
the dismissal, apparently on the ground that he had no authority to en-
tertain such a motion.347 Consequently, the court of appeals decided that 
the circuit court should have dismissed the case without prejudice, re-
turning the case to arbitration.348 
Stifler and McClurkin should offer little persuasive authority for a 
remand to arbitration. Neither decision offers an analysis for concluding 
that a failure in the arbitration process of a kind warranting that the 
award be vacated349 constitutes a failure to render an award under the 
Act, requiring a return to arbitration.350 Future appellate consideration 
of this issue hopefully will limit the Stifler and McClurkin decisions to 
their facts and will offer only the remedy of vacating the award, as the 
Act mandates. 351 
There is one situation in which a case should be returned to arbitra-
tion, albeit not by remand-when a party has prematurely sought judi-
cial review. This situation occurred in Munzer v. Ramsey,352 a case in 
which the arbitration panel failed to forward its decision to the HCAO 
and failed to assess costS.353 Nevertheless, the claimants sought judicial 
review by filing a declaration and notice ofrejection.354 The circuit court 
found that no award had been entered and remanded the case to 
arbitration. 355 
345. Id. at 234, 498 A.2d at 631. 
346.Id. 
347. Id. at 235-36, 498 A.2d at 631-32. The court of appeals implicitly decided that the 
panel chair did have the power to reconsider his dismissal. Id. at 236, 498 A.2d at 
632. The decision does not address whether the motion to reconsider was an appli-
cation for modification or correction or some other procedural mechanism. See 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); id. § 3-222. 
348. 304 Md. at 236, 498 A.2d at 632. The court of appeals cited Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 
Md. App. 350,492 A.2d 946 (1985), a case in which return to arbitration was ap-
propriate. See infra notes 352-358 and accompanying text. 
349. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988); id. § 3-
224(b)(3); see also supra notes 316-326 and accompanying text (discussing motions 
to vacate). 
350. Cf infra notes 352-358 and accompanying text (discussing Munzer v. Ramsey, 63 
Md. App. 350, 492 A.2d 946 (1985)). 
351. This view is in accord with other commentators discussing Stifler and the ability to 
remand. See MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 4, at 499 & nn. 122-23. 
352. 63 Md. App. 350, 492 A.2d 946. 
353. Id. at 354, 492 A.2d at 950. 
354. Id.; see also supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text (discussing time for seeking 
judicial review). 
355. 63 Md. App. at 355, 492 A.2d at 948. The circuit court and the claimant differed 
over whether the case should be remanded to the panel originally convened to hear 
the case or whether a new panel should be convened. The claimant sought a new 
panel, while the circuit court, in its remand, ordered the original panel to reconvene. 
The court of special appeals did not decide this issue, since it had decided that 
dismissal of the judicial review action would "return the matter to the arbitration 
process." Id. at 362, 492 A.2d at 952. Although the parties could seek removal of 
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The court of special appeals agreed that no award had been ren-
dered and thus held that a condition precedent to circuit court action 
had not been met. 356 Consequently, the court of special appeals dis-
missed the judicial review action357 but ordered that the dismissal be 
without prejudice, thereby returning the case to arbitration. 358 
Thus, despite limited decisions that seemingly approve remand, the 
language of the Act indicates that remand is not available. Only when an 
award is not rendered and a case prematurely arrives in circuit court 
should the case return to arbitration upon dismissal of the circuit court 
case. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
The procedure for obtaining judicial review contained in section 3-
2A-06 of the Act is overly complicated, contains many traps for the un-
wary, and, as is evidenced by the various approaches taken by the appel-
late courts, is not susceptible to easy interpretation. The purpose for the 
notice of rejection evidently is merely to advise the parties and the Direc-
tor of the status of the award. 359 Although a notice of action to nullify is 
the mechanism for instituting a medical malpractice action in circuit 
court,360 the sole purpose of such notice is to prompt a complaint by a 
claimant seeking further relief. Modification of these judicial review pro-
cedures so that parties may easily comply with them and so that appel-
late courts can easily apply them if they are not complied with furthers 
the Act's goals and is in everyone's best interests. 
The solution to this currently cumbersome procedure is to revive the 
notion that medical malpractice litigation in the circuit court is not a 
continuation of arbitration, but rather a case with a condition prece-
dent.361 Instead of the three pleadings "required to be filed now-notice 
of rejection, notice of action to nullify, and complaint--one pleading, a 
complaint, could easily be substituted when a claimant seeks to reject the 
award.362 In addition to containing sufficient allegations to survive a mo-
the existing panel members, MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03(b)(4), 
the mere fact that a panel chairperson already has evidenced an intention to rule 
against one party by unsuccessfully attempting to enter a determination should not 
represent good cause to remove him under that provision of the Act, since the panel 
chairperson may reconsider the action. See McClurkin v. Maldonado, 304 Md. 225, 
236, 498 A.2d 626, 632 (1985). 
356. 63 Md. App. at 360, 492 A.2d at 950-51. 
357.Id. 
358. Id. at 362, 492 A.2d at 952. In so doing, the court specifically did not consider the 
validity of a remand to arbitration, although it cited both Stifter v. Weiner, 62 Md. 
App. 19,488 A.2d 192 (1985), and Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318,452 A.2d 
1302 (1982). See 63 Md. App. at 362, 492 A.2d at 950-52. 
359. See Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 612-13, 500 A.2d 636, 639-40 (1985). 
360. Id. at 612, 500 A.2d at 639. 
361. See supra note 218. 
362. Although the Act may presently be interpreted to permit this procedure, there is no 
reason to perpetuate a statutory scheme that requires the uncertainty of judicial 
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tion to dismiss,363 the complaint should contain a reference to the arbi-
tration proceeding and thereby will show that the plaintiff complied with 
the statutory condition precedent.364 Furthermore, the complaint should 
contain a statement that the plaintiff rejects the award. In order to avoid 
allegations of lack of notice, original process should issue from the circuit 
court to be served on the defendant in accordance with the applicable 
rules,365 and a copy of the complaint should be mailed to the HCAO to 
complete its records. 
This proposed procedure has many benefits. First, it reduces the 
number of pleadings to be filed and the chances for error. Second, it 
makes medical malpractice litigation much more similar to other forms 
of tort litigation.366 Third, it permits the plaintiff to select venue and 
avoids the circuitous method now in place under the Act.367 
The procedure for defendants also could be simplified by requiring 
that the defendant file only a notice of rejection, thus avoiding the notice 
of action to nullify. The claimant would then be required to file a com-
plaint in court within thirty days thereafter. 
In order to reduce the parties' uncertainty, the claimant should file 
the complaint within thirty days after service of the award or filing of the 
notice of rejection. Failure to do so should be an absolute bar to further 
proceedings and should permit the health care provider to submit to a 
circuit court a favorable award for confirmation. 368 Only under these 
circumstances would a petition for confirmation need to be filed and con-
sidered by the circuit court. 
Once the complaint is filed, further proceedings in the circuit court 
would be governed entirely by the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Thus, 
the circuit court would determine sanctions for a plaintiff's or a defend-
ant's failure to file an appropriate complaint or other motion as it would 
for any other violation of the rules.369 This procedure would simplify the 
present process and provide the parties with a more certain outcome, 
interpretation to achieve this goal. 304 Md. at 615,500 A.2d at 641 (McAuliffe, J., 
concurring). 
363. For practical discussion of the elements of the variations of a medical negligence 
case, see M. SHAR, supra note 224. 
364. See Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 Md. 641, 656, 526 
A.2d 46, 54 (1987) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (allegation of compliance with arbitra-
tion could easily be included in complaint). 
365. MD. R. 2-112 to -114,2-121 to -126. 
366. MD. R. 2-101 (case commenced by complaint). 
367. MD. R. BY4(a)(2); see Teimourian v. Spence, 59 Md. App. 74, 474 A.2d 919 (1984); 
see also supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussion of operation of Rule 
BY4(a)(2». 
368. Cf MD. CTs. & JUD. PRoe. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(i) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (current 
provision permitting confirmation). 
369. MD. R. 1-201(a); cf Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 309 
Md. 641, 526 A.2d 46 (1987); Golub v. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394, 
cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 954 (1987); Brothers V. Sinai Hosp., 63 Md. App. 
235,492 A.2d 656 (1985), aff'd sub nom., Cherry V. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 507 A.2d 
613 (1986); Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519,490 A.2d 720, cert. 
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In addition to the procedure for seeking judicial review, the section 
of the Act dealing with the effect of the award also should be amended to 
establish clearly that the award merely shifts the burden of persuasion 
but does not displace the requirement that a plaintiff establish a prima 
facie case and does not take away a circuit court's authority to grant 
motions to dismiss,370 motions for summary judgment,371 and motions 
for judgment372 under appropriate circumstances. 
By reviewing the Act and the BY Rules and making these and other 
proposed changes,373 the General Assembly and the court of appeals374 
could achieve considerable progress toward reducing the complexity and 
expense of compliance with the Act's procedures. 375 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article's review of the operation of the Act and discussion of 
the various interpretations of the Act's provisions by the court of appeals 
and the court of special appeals reveal that there is considerable room for 
improvement. Although many would prefer to achieve that improve-
ment by abolishing the Act, their inability to do so does not obviate the 
necessity for a statutory scheme which is understandable and which does 
not place undue hardships on litigants who strive to operate within the 
guidelines established by the legislature. This article is intended to serve 
both as a guide for the practitioner where guidelines are ascertainable 
and to serve as a catalyst for change where either the Act or judicial 
interpretation of it make guidelines impossible. 
denied, 304 Md. 163,498 A.2d 269 (1985) (cases considering violations of BY Rules 
under current provisions of Act). 
370. MD. R. 2-322. 
371. MD. R. 2-501. 
372. MD. R. 2-519, 2-532. 
373. The Special Committee Report, supra note 4, contained many suggestions for 
amending the Act to permit it to function in a more efficient manner. Similarly, this 
article presents other suggestions for change. See supra notes 6, 22, 23, 46, 48, and 
326. 
374. Only the General Assembly could modify the Act so as to do away with the notice 
of rejection and clarify the effect of the award's presumption, since both of those 
provisions are found in the Act itself. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
06 (1984 & Supp. 1988). The court of appeals, however, could implement the other 
suggested changes on its own, through modifications of the BY Rules. Such a modi-
fication is authorized by section 3-2A-06(b) of the Act. Id. § 3-2A-06(b). As of the 
date of publication of this article, the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure was considering changes to the BY Rules. 
375. Cj Special Committee Report, supra note 4, app. A, at 143 (suggests abolition of 
Act instead of procedural change). 
